Washington and Lee Law Review Online
Volume 73

Issue 1

Article 1

5-18-2016

Condemning Clothes: The Constitutionality of Taking Trademarks
in the Professional Sports Franchise Context
Mitchell Diles
Washington and Lee University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mitchell Diles, Condemning Clothes: The Constitutionality of Taking Trademarks in the Professional
Sports Franchise Context, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2016), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/
wlulr-online/vol73/iss1/1

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington and Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review Online
by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Condemning Clothes:
The Constitutionality of Taking
Trademarks in the Professional Sports
Franchise Context
Mitchell D. Diles*
Abstract
The resurgence in franchise free agency in the National
Football League (NFL) potentially implicates the loss of a
significant source of local identity and tradition for multiple
cities. In January 2016, NFL owners approved the relocation of
the Rams franchise from St. Louis, Missouri, to Los Angeles,
California, by a vote of thirty-to-two. The owners’ vote also
potentially implicates the relocation of the San Diego Chargers
and the Oakland Raiders. Though applauded by numerous sports
commentators, athletes, and fans, the vote reflects the failure of
negotiations between the City of St. Louis and the Rams
organization. The approval also sets the stage for a new
generation of controversies over valuable team property. This
includes disputes over team logos and other trademarks.
Although cities and fans may appear helpless when faced
with franchise relocation, one powerful, although rarely invoked,
point of leverage for local governments is the threat of exercising
eminent domain power. In theory, this action could prevent a team
from relocating. During the 1980s and 1990s, efforts to prevent
professional sports franchises from moving, which included
condemnation proceedings initiated by multiple cities, largely
failed. Given the current, broad interpretation of the public use
*
Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May
2017. I am eternally grateful to Professor Christopher Seaman for inspiring this
Note and for his constant guidance and feedback. I would also like to thank the
Washington and Lee Law Review editorial boards for their thoughtful edits and
suggestions. Finally, thank you to my parents, David and Suzanne, for their
enduring love and support in all my endeavors. I owe all my success to them.

1

2

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2016)

language in the Takings Clause, however, it is unclear whether
another eminent domain action could succeed. Moreover, it is
unclear whether an eminent domain action could seize a moving
franchise’s trademarks given the “propertization” of trademarks
and other forms of intellectual property.
This Note examines whether a city could exercise its eminent
domain powers to acquire the intangible intellectual property
rights associated with a professional sports franchise, specifically
a team’s trademarks and associated goodwill. In doing so, it
examines the unresolved issue of whether trademarks constitute
constitutionally protected private property under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. If trademarks constitute
constitutionally protected private property, the Fifth Amendment
provides users of the mark with enhanced protection against
government seizures. In the context of professional sports
franchises, this would give teams greater protection upon
relocation.
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I. Introduction
As Jerry Seinfeld famously explained, sports fans cheer for
clothes.1 In many respects, he is right. The clothes represent a
particular brand—the city, the franchise’s history, and a prized
form of entertainment.2 Essentially, a professional sports team
and the clothes its players wear symbolize the franchise’s home
community.3 Teams help give their fans a sense of belonging and
1. See Seinfeld: The Label Maker (NBC television broadcast Jan. 19, 1995)
(discussing the phenomenon of fan loyalty to any one sports franchise,
regardless of the players for that team). According to Seinfeld’s observations,
“[l]oyalty to any one sports team is pretty hard to justify, because the players
are always changing, the team could move to another city. You’re actually
rooting for the clothes when you get right down to it.” Id. Often, he notes, “[f]ans
will be so in love with a player, but if he goes to another team, they boo him.” Id.
2. See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 672 (4th ed. 2010)
(describing the desire of fans to identify with a favorite franchise or athletic
organization, which results in the purchase of items ranging from hats to jerseys
to pennants “that carry a team name, nickname, team player name or number,
logo, or symbol of the organization”).
3. See Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports
Franchise Relocations from Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing
Marketplace Competition, League Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing
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something to believe in, something to look forward to, and
something that they take pride in.4 Though athletes and coaches
come and go, the franchise remains.5
In the context of professional sports, trademarks protect a
franchise’s exclusive interest in the names, colors,6 logos, and
symbols fans associate with the team.7 For any company in a
competitive market, the ability to capture the attention of
consumers is an invaluable asset.8 The same is true for sports
teams.9 With the help of trademarks, the clothes players wear
create an identifiable image through which a team promotes its
products and services.10 Considering the increase in popularity of
professional sports and modern sports marketing, trademark
licensing is a growing, multi-million dollar industry.11
Field, 56 MD. L. REV. 57, 59 (1997) (discussing the relationship between a
professional sports franchise and its host city in the context of franchise
relocation).
4. See id. (explaining the effect of a professional sports franchise on its
host community).
5. See id. (observing that professional sports franchises often become
“deeply ingrained in the local identity” of their host communities).
6. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995)
(holding that trademark protection may extend to a single color).
7. See WONG, supra note 2, at 665 (illustrating the additional revenue that
sports teams earn by licensing their trademarks).
8. See Dannean J. Hetzel, Professional Athletes and Sports Teams: The
Nexus of Their Identity Protection, 11 SPORTS L.J. 141, 143 (2004) (commenting
on the value of identity for any professional athlete or sports franchise).
9. See id. (showing the increase in value and popularity of sports
franchises over the years).
10. See WONG, supra note 2, at 665–66 (describing the primary, historical
purposes underlying a sports franchise’s trademark, and the emergence of
trademark licensing as a significant revenue source for teams); Hetzel, supra
note 8, at 142 (noting that “[p]rofessional . . . sports teams generate millions of
dollars each year using their popularity to sell products and services”).
11. See Mark S. Nagel & Daniel A. Rascher, Washington “Redskins”Disparaging Term or Valuable Tradition?: Legal and Economic Issues
Concerning Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 789, 796 (2007) (commenting on the recent trend among professional sports
teams in “releasing multiple versions of their uniforms, hats, and other licensed
merchandise to enhance revenues by capitalizing on their trademarks and
logos”); Sean H. Brogan, Who Are These “Colts?”: The Likelihood of Confusion,
Consumer Survey Evidence and Trademark Abandonment in Indianapolis Colts,
Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club, Ltd., 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 39, 39
(1996) (illustrating “how professional football is experiencing a sharp increase in
competition for valuable trademarks”).
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Consequently, professional sports leagues and teams vigorously
protect their trademarks and associated goodwill from
infringement.12
The increase in value of professional sports franchises
parallels the growing popularity of professional sports in
general.13 Taking both tangible and intangible property rights
into consideration, estimates value professional sports franchises
in the hundreds of millions, and even billions, of dollars.14
Although difficult to quantify, the intangible intellectual property
interests associated with a professional sports franchise add
substantial value and marketability.15 As Seinfeld might put it, a
big chunk of the value of sports teams is fans cheering for
clothes.16
Unfortunately for some fans, the potential for franchise
relocation is a reality among professional sports leagues.17 In
particular, a team may engage in “franchise free agency”18 when
12. See WONG, supra note 2, at 665 (describing how professional sports
leagues and franchises often initiate lawsuits to retain exclusive trademark
rights). Related to trademarks, goodwill, as defined by one court, is “the
favorable consideration shown by the purchasing public to goods known to
emanate from a particular source.” See White Tower Sys. v. White Castle Sys. of
Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir. 1937) (enjoining a junior user who
substantially appropriated a trade name, advertising slogan, and building type
of another in the same business with established goodwill).
13. See Kurt Badenhausen, The World’s 50 Most Valuable Teams 2015,
FORBES
(July
15,
2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2015/07/15/the-worlds-50-mostvaluable-sports-teams-2015/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (ranking the world’s
fifty most valuable sports franchises, which include twenty National Football
League (NFL) franchises, twelve Major League Baseball (MLB) franchises, and
ten National Basketball Association (NBA) franchises) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See id. (describing that, on average, the world’s fifty most valuable
sports teams are worth an estimated $1.75 billion).
15. Id.
16. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text (introducing the
phenomenon of sports fans cheering for clothes).
17. See Brogan, supra note 11, at 40 (referring to the underlying financial
interests that influence a professional football team’s desire to relocate).
18. Originally coined by former NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle, the term
refers to the competition among cities to attract major league teams. See Don
Nottingham, Keeping the Home Team at Home: Antitrust and Trademark Law
as Weapons in the Fight Against Professional Sports Franchise Relocation, 75 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1067–72 (2004) (detailing the phenomenon of franchise free
agency). Traditionally, the term “free agent” refers to a player without a
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requesting or demanding certain benefits from local and state
governments, such as tax-free financing for new stadiums.19
Fearful of angry fans and other consequences of relocation, local
politicians regularly capitulate to these demands.20 Additionally,
some politicians contend that granting these benefits, like new
stadiums, will provide new employment opportunities and spur
economic development.21
Although teams may appear to hold most of the cards in
relocation, one powerful, although rarely invoked, point of
leverage for local governments is the threat of exercising eminent
domain power22 to seize the franchise.23 In theory, this action
contractual obligation to play for any particular team. Id. at 1067 n.4. The
absence of any obligation permits that player to negotiate with his former team
and other interested teams until a satisfactory deal is reached. Id. Similarly, a
franchise free agent is a team that shops for a new home and a superior
situation. Id.
19. See Michael Colangelo, Teams Continue to Use Relocation Threat as
Leverage,
FIELDS
OF
GREEN
(Dec.
22,
2014),
http://thefieldsofgreen.com/2014/12/22/chargers-rams-raiders-relocation-kingspatriots-venues/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (asserting that the threat of
relocation to obtain financial benefits is not a new practice among professional
sports franchises) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
20. See Mitten & Burton, supra note 3, at 58 (mentioning the cultural
truism that any community’s most visible and cherished asset is its local
professional sports franchise).
21. The perceived public benefits from hosting a professional sports
franchise include enhanced reputation and prestige, additional job
opportunities, increased sales and use taxes, new recreational opportunities,
and enhanced civic pride and youth interest in sports. Id. at 60 n.6. Most
economists, however, present a skeptical view that utilizing public funds to
support a professional sports franchise contributes to economic growth. See, e.g.,
Andrew Zimbalist & Roger G. Noll, Sports, Jobs, & Taxes: Are New Stadiums
Worth
the
Cost?,
BROOKINGS
INST.
(June
1997),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1997/06/summer-taxes-noll
(last
visited Apr. 18, 2016) (concluding that sports teams and facilities are not a
source of local economic growth and employment and that public support of
professional sports is a poor investment decision) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). For a more in depth discussion of the economic impact of
professional sports franchises on local economies, see generally SPORTS, JOBS
AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS (Roger G.
Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997) (exploring the appropriate methods for
measuring economic benefits derived from professional sports franchises and
including case studies of major league sports facilities in various markets).
22. Eminent domain, in its broadest sense, is the power of government to
take property for public use without the owner’s consent, provided that the
owner receive just compensation. See Eminent Domain, BLACK’S LAW
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could prevent a team from relocating.24 There are numerous legal
issues involved with the exercise of eminent domain in this
context, however, many of which have not been fully explored.25
Among these is whether a professional sports team’s trademark
can be seized as part of a franchise.26 If successful, cities could
avoid a significant loss of local identity and tradition.27
This Note examines whether a city could exercise its eminent
domain powers to acquire the intangible intellectual property
rights associated with a professional sports franchise, specifically
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining eminent domain as “[t]he inherent power
of a governmental entity to take privately owned property, esp. land, and
convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking”).
23. See, e.g., Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club
Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 279 (D. Md. 1985) (involving “the attempt of the Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore to condemn a professional football team—
formerly the Baltimore Colts, and now doing business as the Indianapolis
Colts”); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 837 (Cal. 1982)
(concerning the City of Oakland’s eminent domain action to acquire the property
rights associated with ownership of the Raiders professional football team as a
franchise member of the NFL).
24. See Thomas W. E. Joyce, III, The Constitutionality of Taking a Sports
Franchise by Eminent Domain and the Need for Federal Legislation to Restrict
Franchise Relocation, 13 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 553, 553–96 (1984) (exploring the
constitutionality of public use, just compensation, right to travel, and Commerce
Clause limitations as applied to the taking of sports franchises by eminent
domain following the City of Oakland’s unsuccessful attempt to seize the
Oakland Raiders franchise).
25. See id. at 596 (concluding that eminent domain is not an appropriate
method in preventing the relocation of sports franchises); see also Charles Gray,
Note, Keeping the Home Team at Home, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1329, 1329–72 (1986)
(discussing the potential limitations on a city’s ability to condemn a sports
franchise, the impact of the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution on the
exercise of eminent domain, the potential restriction of the right to travel that
might result from a sports franchise taking, and antitrust implications); Greg L.
Johnson, Note, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Raiders IV): Commerce
Clause Scrutiny as an End-Run Around Traditional Public Use Analysis, 1 BYU
J. PUB. L. 335, 335–61 (1987) (examining whether the Public Use Clause can be
legitimately extended to a sports franchise).
26. See Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property
Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 536 (1998) (noting that the
vast majority of Supreme Court decisions regarding the Takings Clause concern
actions initiated in response to government takings of real, as opposed to
personal or intangible, property).
27. See Brogan, supra note 11, at 73 (arguing that the increasing exodus of
professional sports franchises from their host cities “sets the stage for future
trademark disputes over valuable team logos and other trademarks”).
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a team’s trademark and associated goodwill. Such property rights
are critical to the identity of sports teams and their host
communities. To address that question, this Note considers the
broader
question
of
whether
trademarks
constitute
constitutionally protected private property under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Understanding the scope of
trademark law and its intersection with takings jurisprudence
helps clarify the property interests associated with trademarks
and the degree of protection those interests receive.
Part II summarizes historical disputes regarding franchise
relocation to introduce the possibility that a city could exercise its
eminent domain powers to seize a moving team’s trademark
rights.28 It then reviews the NFL’s recent approval of the Rams
franchise to relocate to Los Angeles, California.29 Part III
explains the legal background necessary for understanding the
issues surrounding the Takings Clause and its application to
intangible intellectual property rights, including trademarks.30
Part IV provides a brief overview of the four major categories of
intangible intellectual property rights—trade secrets, patents,
copyrights, and trademarks—and how the private property
interests of each differ.31 Part V proceeds in two stages: First, it
evaluates the unresolved issue of whether trademarks constitute
constitutionally protected private property under the Takings
Clause.32 Second, it argues that trademarks should be considered
constitutionally protected private property.33 Part VI concludes
that trademarks are constitutional private property interests to
28. See infra Part II.A (describing the relocation of four NFL franchises
during the 1980s and 1990s, as well as their consequences).
29. See infra Part II.B (illustrating modern franchise free agency in the
NFL).
30. See infra Part III (discussing the historical justifications for the
Takings Clause, its jurisprudence, and its application to forms of property other
than real property).
31. See infra Part IV (differentiating between the four major categories of
intellectual property and the bundle of rights associated with each).
32. See infra Part V.A–B (discussing the arguments against treating
trademarks as private property rights and contemporary judicial guidance,
which future courts would likely apply to the trademark taking issue).
33. See infra Part V.C (concluding that, based on recent judicial guidance
and the propertization of trademarks and other forms of intellectual property,
trademarks should be considered constitutionally protected private property).
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professional sports franchises but ultimately determines that the
taking of a team’s trademark could constitute a valid public use.34
II. Franchise Relocation: The NFL as a Case Study
This Part discusses franchise relocation as an ongoing issue,
using the NFL as a case study. It first summarizes historical
disputes regarding franchise relocation in the NFL in the 1980s
and 1990s.35 It then addresses the NFL’s recent decision to
permit the Rams franchise to move from St. Louis, Missouri, to
Los Angeles, California.36
A. The 1980s: Oakland and Baltimore
During the 1980s, two cities went to court to prevent their
teams from relocating.37 Both the City of Baltimore and the City
of Oakland attempted to take title to their local NFL teams
through the exercise of eminent domain power.38 In addition to
other arguments, the cities asserted that the condemnation of a
professional sports franchise qualified as a valid public use.39
34. See infra Part VI (concluding that, even with heightened constitutional
protection under the Takings Clause, the seizure of a relocating professional
sports franchise’s trademark could constitute a valid public use).
35. See infra Part II.A (discussing relocation disputes arising in the cities
of Oakland and Baltimore in the 1980s, and in the cities of Cleveland and
Houston in the 1990s).
36. See infra Part II.B (explaining that, presently, multiple cities face
relocation dilemmas created by franchise free agency).
37. See infra Part II.C (summarizing condemnation proceedings initiated
by the cities of Oakland and Baltimore in an attempt to block the relocation of
two professional football franchises).
38. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Raiders I), 176 Cal. Rptr. 646,
647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (representing the first wave of litigation resulting from
the City of Oakland’s attempt to condemn the Raiders franchise), vacated sub
nom., 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore
Football Club Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 279 (D. Md. 1985) (involving the City of
Baltimore’s attempt to seize the Colts franchise following their infamous
midnight move to Indianapolis, Indiana).
39. See Jonathan N. Portner, Comment, The Continued Expansion of the
Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 542, 548–51
(1988) (examining the evolution of the public use requirement of the Takings
Clause and its influence on sports franchises).
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This subpart discusses the events preceding the disputes and the
judicial resolution of both controversies.40
1. Oakland Raiders v. City of Oakland
The first example of a city’s attempt to seize the property
rights associated with the ownership of a professional sports
franchise occurred almost four decades ago.41 In 1980, Oakland
Raiders owner Al Davis announced his intention to move the
franchise to Los Angeles, California.42 In the years leading up to
the announcement, the franchise recorded thirteen consecutive
sellout seasons.43 Soon after the announcement, the City of
Oakland filed an eminent domain action to acquire the property
rights associated with the ownership of the Raiders as a franchise
member of the NFL.44
40. See infra Part II.A.1–2 (discussing the litigation following the
relocation of the Raiders and Colts franchises and the various judicial decisions
reached).
41. See Raiders I, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 647 (concluding that California law did
not authorize the condemnation of the Raiders franchise), vacated sub nom., 646
P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982).
42. “In 1966, the Raiders and the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc.,
a nonprofit corporation, entered into a five-year licensing agreement for use of
the Oakland Coliseum by the Raiders.” See Raiders I, 646 P.2d at 837
(describing the contractual agreement between the Raiders franchise and the
City of Oakland). The contract included five three-year renewal options. Id. The
Raiders exercised the first three renewals, but failed to negotiate a fourth
extension for the 1980 season. Id.
43. See Sanjay Jose’ Mullick, Browns to Baltimore: Franchise Free Agency
and the New Economics of the NFL, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 20 (1996) (noting
that part of the agreement reached between Al Davis and the City of Los
Angeles included “a luxury box package of unshared revenue amounting to over
three times what Oakland could offer,” which, subsequently, generated
significantly more revenue for the franchise).
44. See Raiders I, 646 P.2d 835, 837 (Cal. 1982) (summarizing that the
Raiders argued that the law of eminent domain did not permit the taking of
intangible property and that the City of Oakland could not establish a valid
public use). The Oakland relocation controversy also resulted in antitrust
litigation. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F. 2d 1381, 1384–86
(9th Cir. 1984) (describing the background and facts of the lawsuit). One week
after Al Davis’s announcement, league owners voted unanimously against the
move under Rule 4.3 of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws. See id. at 1385
(“[T]he NFL teams voted . . . 22–0 against the move, with five teams
abstaining.”). The rule requires an affirmative vote of three-fourths from
franchise owners to approve relocation. Id. In response, Al Davis, joined by the
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In the original lawsuit, Raiders I, the Superior Court granted
the Raiders franchise summary judgment and dismissed the
action with prejudice.45 The trial judge found that “no essential
public use to an eminent domain action could be found, and [that
the City] lacked the authority to exercise eminent domain for the
purpose of keeping the Raiders’ franchise in Oakland.”46 The
appellate court affirmed the decision.47
On appeal, the California Supreme Court determined that
the trial court erred in granting the Raiders franchise summary
judgment.48 Therefore, it reversed and remanded the case back to
the trial court.49 In reaching its conclusion, the court considered
two major issues: (1) whether the law of eminent domain permits
the taking of intangible property,50 and (2) whether the public use
requirement permitted the taking of a professional sports
franchise.51
Addressing the first issue, the California Supreme Court
concluded that, “[f]or eminent domain purposes, neither the
federal nor the state Constitution distinguishes between property

Los Angeles Coliseum, sued the NFL. Id. They claimed that Rule 4.3 violated
section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act by unlawfully restraining trade. Id.
Hearing the case on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
determined that the NFL violated federal antitrust laws by attempting to block
the move, allowing the Raiders franchise to move to Los Angeles. Id. at 1401. In
a subsequent lawsuit, the Ninth Circuit held the NFL liable for treble damages
that totaled approximately $50 million. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v.
NFL, 791 F. 2d 1356, 1376 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming a trebled damage verdict in
favor of the Los Angeles Coliseum but vacating the Raiders’ antitrust damage
recovery).
45. See Raiders I, 646 P.2d at 837 (“The City of Oakland . . . appeals from a
summary judgment dismissing with prejudice . . . .”).
46. See Joyce, III, supra note 24, at 555 (quoting the unreported decision of
the lower court) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id.
48. See Raiders I, 646 P.2d at 837 (considering whether a sufficient factual
controversy existed to warrant a trial on the merits).
49. See id. (“We conclude that the trial court erred in granting the
summary judgment and we reverse and remand the case for a full evidentiary
trial of the issues on the merits.”).
50. See id. at 837 (noting that the Raiders characterized the property rights
associated with the franchise as a “network of intangible contractual rights”).
51. See id. (adding that the Raiders also argued that the public use
requirement did not encompass the City of Oakland’s proposed action).
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which is real or personal, tangible or intangible.”52 Regarding the
public use issue, the court determined only “that the acquisition
and, indeed, the operation of a sports franchise may be an
appropriate municipal function.”53 However, the court explicitly
stated its refusal to decide the merits of the City of Oakland’s
condemnation claim.54 Instead, the court instructed the trial
court to determine whether a valid public use justified the City of
Oakland’s eminent domain action on remand.55
The case moved between the trial and appellate court levels
for the next three years.56 During that time, the Raiders relocated
and played their home games in Los Angeles.57 But, after years of
litigation and appeals, the California Court of Appeals entered
judgment for the Raiders on final remand.58 The court based its
decision on three independent grounds: (1) the Public Use
Clause, (2) federal antitrust laws, and (3) the Commerce Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.59
In its opinion, the final Raiders court (Raiders IV) first
addressed the trial court’s determination that the Commerce
Clause of the federal constitution invalidated the City of
Oakland’s action.60 It noted that years of precedent established
52. Id. at 840.
53. Id. at 843.
54. See id. at 845 (“[W]e do not decide whether [the] City has a meritorious
condemnation claim in this case.”).
55. See id. (noting that the City of Oakland’s “ability to prove a valid public
use for its proposed action” remained untested).
56. See City of Oakland v. Superior Court (Raiders II), 186 Cal. Rptr. 326,
329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (granting the City of Oakland’s request for a writ of
mandate requiring the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the
application to reinstate the preliminary injunction); City of Oakland v. Superior
Court (Raiders III), 197 Cal. Rptr. 729, 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (reversing the
trial court, again, and remanding the case for further hearings on several issues,
including whether the taking served a public use), appeal filed, 220 Cal. Rptr.
153 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986).
57. See Nottingham, supra note 18, at 1076 n.62 (mentioning that the
Raiders franchise moved back to the City of Oakland in 1995).
58. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Raiders IV), 220 Cal. Rptr.
153, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that the City of Oakland’s attempted
seizure of the Raiders franchise violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986).
59. See id. at 155 (describing that, on remand, the trial court again entered
judgment for the Raiders franchise based on three independent grounds).
60. See id. (“We turn first to the trial court’s commerce clause
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“that a state may exercise eminent domain power even though by
so doing it indirectly or incidentally burdens interstate
commerce.”61 But the court accepted the Raiders contention that,
because professional football is a nationwide business, the seizure
of a franchise by eminent domain would constitute an undue
burden on interstate commerce.62 This burden outweighed any
state interest in enforcing its antitrust laws against the Oakland
Raiders franchise.63
The court’s conclusion on the Commerce Clause and antitrust
issues signaled defeat for the City of Oakland.64 Regardless, the
court engaged in a short discussion of an essential question facing
any challenge to an eminent domain action: whether the taking
constituted a valid public use.65 The City of Oakland alleged that
its reasons for condemnation—which included the promotion of
public recreation, social welfare, and related economic benefits—
satisfied the public use requirement.66 The court disagreed,
finding the City of Oakland’s arguments unpersuasive.67 Though
presumptively legitimate, local interests did not outweigh the
foreseeable burdens on interstate commerce.68
determination.”).
61. Id. at 156. Stated another way, a state’s exercise of eminent domain
violates the Commerce Clause if it impermissibly burdens or affects interstate
commerce. Id.
62. See id. at 156–57 (“Plaintiff’s proposed action would more than
indirectly or incidentally regulate interstate commerce . . . [t]his is the precise
brand of parochial meddling with the national economy that the commerce
clause was designed to prohibit.”).
63. See id. at 157 (“Fragmentation of the league structure on the basis of
state lines would adversely affect the success of the competitive business
enterprise, and differing state antitrust decisions if applied to the enterprise
would likely compel all member teams to comply with the laws of the strictest
state.”).
64. See id. at 158 (“Our conclusion on the commerce clause obviates the
need for further consideration of the public use and antitrust arguments.”).
65. Id.
66. See id. (noting that the City of Oakland desired “to best utilize the
stadium in which the Raiders played”).
67. See id. (characterizing the City of Oakland’s public use claims as
presumably legitimate but less compelling).
68. See id. (“[T]he burden that would be imposed on interstate commerce
outweighs the local interest in exercising statutory eminent domain authority
over the Raiders franchise.”); see also infra Part VI.A (discussing the
precedential value of the public use determination in the Raiders litigation).
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2. Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore

The Raiders cases signaled the beginning of the modern
franchise free agency era in professional sports.69 Moving
forward, courts characterized NFL franchises as business
enterprises rather than agents of their host cities.70 Taking
advantage of the precedent set by the Raiders organization,
multiple franchises demonstrated an interest in relocation—
among them, the Baltimore Colts.71
Beginning in late 1983 and early 1984, Baltimore Colts
owner Robert Irsay entered into extensive negotiations with the
mayor of Baltimore, William Donald Schaefer, to address the
terms of his stadium lease.72 Among other things, the discussions
included the possibility of constructing a new stadium to replace
the aging Baltimore Memorial Stadium.73 When negotiations
failed to produce an agreement, Irsay explored the possibility of
relocating the Colts to Indianapolis, Indiana.74
Faced with the prospect of losing the Colts, on February 24,
1984, the Maryland State Senate introduced a bill to amend the
City of Baltimore’s charter.75 The proposed legislation authorized
69. See Katherine C. Leone, No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency in
the National Football League, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 493–95 (1997)
(summarizing franchise free agency’s harm to professional sports leagues).
70. See, e.g., Raiders IV, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 157 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(characterizing the Raiders franchise as a “competitive business enterprise”).
71. See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club Inc.,
624 F. Supp. 278, 279 (D. Md. 1985) (involving an eminent domain action
initiated by the City of Baltimore following the relocation of the Colts franchise
to Indianapolis, Indiana).
72. See id. (discussing the events leading to the City of Baltimore’s attempt
to condemn the Colts franchise).
73. See Philip B. Wilson, Thirty Years Later, Remembering How Colts’ Move
Went
Down,
USA
TODAY
(Mar.
29,
2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/colts/2014/03/29/indianapolisbaltimore-move-30-year-anniversary-mayflower/7053553/ (last visited Apr. 18,
2016) (describing Irsay’s dissatisfaction with the outdated Memorial Stadium
and declining fan attendance at home games) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
74. See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 624 F. Supp. at 279 (noting that
the Mayor of Indianapolis organized a control group comprised of local
politicians and businessmen to negotiate with the Colts organization in the hope
of persuading the franchise to relocate).
75. Id.
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the city to condemn the franchise if the need arose.76 At the same
time, the Colts entered into extended negotiations with “the
Capital Improvements Board of Managers of Marion County,
Indiana (“CIB”), the owner of the Hoosier Dome, concerning the
possibility of a lease of the Dome to the Colts.”77
On the morning of March 27, 1984, the Maryland State
Senate passed this emergency legislation.78 Hearing of the news
the following day, Irsay immediately decided to move the Colts
franchise.79 He instructed Michael Chernoff, vice-president and
general counsel of the Colts, to “conclude the Hoosier Dome
lease . . . [and] move all the Colts’ property from Owings Mills,
Maryland, to Indianapolis immediately.”80
Fearing an imminent eminent domain action, moving
personnel worked through the night of March 28, 1984, to load all
of the Colts’ physical property into the now infamous “Mayflower
moving vans.”81 Departing under the cover of darkness, a convoy
of moving vans left the Colts’ training complex loaded with most
of the team’s office and athletic equipment.82 Their destination:
Indianapolis.83
On March 30, 1984, the Maryland legislature enacted
Emergency Bill No. 1042, the legislation that authorized the City
76. See id. (describing that news of the bill’s introduction, which occurred
on February 24, 1984, quickly reached the Indianapolis control group).
77. Id. In contrast to the Oakland Raiders relocation controversy, the NFL
stated “that it would take no action with respect to any possible move of the
Colts.” Id. at 280–81. The announcement was made in the wake of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in the antitrust lawsuit from the Raiders litigation, which was
released on February 28, 1984. See supra note 44 and accompanying text
(summarizing the antitrust litigation triggered by the Raiders’ relocation
controversy, which resulted in treble damages against the NFL).
78. See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club Inc.,
624 F. Supp. 278, 280 (D. Md. 1985) (explaining that city officials continued to
negotiate a financial package with the Colts franchise to persuade the team to
stay in Baltimore).
79. See id. (adding that Isray learned of the Maryland Senate’s emergency
legislation “from a Chicago newspaper account”).
80. See id. (“Chernoff and the Indianapolis officials executed a twenty-year
lease and the corresponding loan agreement the same day.”).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. (“By the morning of March 29, 1984, the Mayflower [moving]
vans were on their way to Indianapolis.”).
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of Baltimore to condemn sports franchises.84 Under the new
legislation, the city immediately filed a condemnation petition in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.85 The Colts later removed
the action to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.86
Ultimately, the district court invalidated the condemnation.87
First, the court addressed the failure of the City of Baltimore to
make any compensation payment.88 According to Judge Walter E.
Black, Jr., the City of Baltimore had no right to restrict the owner
of a professional football franchise from moving the team beyond
the
state’s
jurisdiction
except
through
payment
of
compensation.89 The mere filing of the condemnation petition did
not automatically bestow the City of Baltimore with rights over
the franchise.90 Of course, as Judge Black noted, it is “axiomatic
that a sovereign state’s power to condemn property extends only
as far as its borders.”91 With the Colts principal place of business
no longer in Maryland, the court determined that the City of
Baltimore’s jurisdictional reach did not extend to the franchise.92
Consequently, the court invalidated the City of Baltimore’s
exercise of eminent domain.93
84. See id. (adding that the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore enacted a
secondary piece of legislation, which also authorized condemnation).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 281.
87. See infra notes 88–93 and accompanying text (describing the reasons
for the court’s conclusion that the City of Baltimore lacked the power to
condemn the Colts’ franchise).
88. See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club Inc.,
624 F. Supp. 278, 283 (D. Md. 1985) (explaining that the relevant provisions of
the Maryland Constitution explicitly prohibited the legislature from seizing
private property until paying or tendering just compensation).
89. See id. (concluding that the relevant provisions of the State of
Maryland’s statutory scheme clearly provided that no taking is valid “until
compensation is paid to the owner or to a court”).
90. See id. (“The City has at no time made any payment of the
compensation that would be required, and, as a result, it had no power to stop
Irsay from treating his property as he wished.”).
91. Id.
92. See id. at 287 (finding that the applicable laws of eminent domain did
not provide a remedy for the City of Baltimore and that, in the courts words,
“the Colts were ‘gone’ on March 30, 1984”).
93. Id. The court did not engage in a public use analysis because the Colts
prevailed on the “threshold issue of the appropriate date for determining the
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B. The 1990s: Cleveland and Houston
As previously mentioned, cities and fans may refuse to let
their teams leave them completely empty-handed upon
relocation.94 This was the case during the Cleveland Browns
relocation controversy of 1995.95 On November 6, 1995, Cleveland
Browns owner Arthur “Art” Modell announced that the city’s
beloved NFL franchise would move to Baltimore, Maryland, for
the 1996 season.96 Outraged, the City of Cleveland filed a breach
of contract claim against the Browns to enjoin Modell from
relocating the team.97 In addition, the City filed a trademark suit
to prevent the Browns’ name from leaving if Modell succeeded in
relocating the team.98 The complaint focused on the history and
situs of the franchise.” Id.
94. See Nottingham, supra note 18, at 1081–89 (discussing “what rights
fans or cities have in a team’s name, colors, and records”).
95. Both the Rams and Raiders franchises also relocated from Los Angeles,
California, during the 1990s. See infra note 118 and accompanying text
(describing the NFL’s exodus from the Southern California market following the
1994 regular season).
96. See Charles Babington & Ken Denlinger, Modell Announces Browns’
Move
to
Baltimore,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
7,
1995),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/sports/longterm/memories/1995/95nfl4.ht
m (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (announcing Art Modell’s plans to move the
Cleveland Browns franchise to Baltimore and describing possible impediments
to the move) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). At the time of
the announcement, the Browns franchise occupied a sixty-four-year-old stadium.
See Nottingham, supra note 18, at 1069 (describing the economic health of the
Browns franchise in 1995). Although the City recently built Jacobs Field, a
brand new stadium for the Cleveland Indians, the Browns were unable to
convince voters to approve funding for another new stadium. Id. But, in
exchange for relocating the Browns franchise, Baltimore offered Modell “a new
stadium, rent-free for seven years, in addition to all revenue from all one
hundred eight luxury boxes, 7500 box seats, parking, and in-stadium
advertising.” Id. Baltimore also paid the Modell’s moving expenses. Id.
97. See Alvin B. Lindsay, Our Team, Our Name, Our Colors: The
Trademark Rights of Cities in Team Name Ownership, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 915,
917–18 (2000) (describing that the breach of contract claim arose out of terms in
the franchise’s stadium lease).
98. See id. at 946 (noting that “The City of Cleveland’s Lanham Act
complaint brought civil actions for unfair competition, wrongful registration,
and misappropriation of trade name and mark designations of origin”). Fans
and local politicians also took other steps to prevent the Browns franchise from
relocating following Modell’s announcement. Id. at 918. Fans formed
organizations to protest the move and held numerous rallies. Id. Cleveland
mayor Michael R. White “hosted a conference of U.S. mayors aimed at arming
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tradition of the Browns in Cleveland since the franchise’s
founding in 1945.99 It also alleged an inseparable connection
between the City of Cleveland and the Browns’ trademarks.100
Unfortunately for the City of Cleveland, its efforts did not
prevent “The Move”101 from occurring.102 Extensive negotiations
between the Browns, the NFL, and officials from both cities,
however, resulted in a settlement that kept the franchise’s legacy
in Cleveland.103 The deal permitted Modell’s team to leave for
Baltimore, but the team name, colors, and records remained in
Cleveland for a new Browns franchise.104
The Cleveland Browns relocation controversy of 1995 is the
most recent example of a city’s attempt to obtain the intangible
intellectual property rights associated with a relocating NFL
franchise.105 A similar legal battle did not ensue when Houston
communities to protect themselves against franchise free agency.” Id. Ohio
Senator John Glenn even “introduced a bill to give the NFL a limited antitrust
exemption to vote to block such moves.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. See id. at 946–47 (summarizing the history of the Browns franchise in
Cleveland).
100. See id. at 946 (characterizing the registered trademarks of the Browns
franchise as being “inseparably connected in the minds of consumers,
particularly with reference to the market for professional football”).
101. See BOB DYER, THE TOP 20 MOMENTS IN CLEVELAND SPORTS:
TREMENDOUS TALES OF HEROES AND HEARTBREAKS 277–91 (2003) (ranking “The
Move” as the third most sensational event in Cleveland sports history).
102. See id. (describing the events leading up to the Browns’ relocation to
Baltimore, Maryland).
103. See Mullick, supra note 43, at 21–22 (analyzing the deal reached
between the NFL and the City of Cleveland in the wake of the team’s
relocation).
104. See id. at 22 (“The NFL then pledged to help finance the construction of
a new football stadium in Cleveland within three years and guaranteed
Cleveland a football team for the 1999 season.”). Additionally, Modell agreed to
pay the City of Cleveland $12 million in damages over four years. See Leone,
supra note 69, at 476 (arguing that congressional action is necessary to protect
the interests of cities and fans from self-interested owners who relocate sports
franchises after accepting local or federal subsidies or public financing for
stadium construction, renovations, or other services).
105. Even though the City of Cleveland did not initiate an eminent domain
action against the Browns franchise, the controversy is nonetheless significant
in illustrating the efforts that a city may take to prevent a professional sports
franchise from relocating. See supra notes 94–104 and accompanying text
(describing multiple legal actions initiated by the City of Cleveland to prevent
the Cleveland Browns franchise from relocating, which included a trademark
suit).
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Oilers owner Bud Adams moved his team to Nashville,
Tennessee, before the 1997 season.106 After relocating, the team
played as the Oilers for its first two seasons in Tennessee.107
During the 1998 season, however, the franchise announced its
intention to forge a new identity as the Tennessee Titans.108 At
the same time, NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue agreed to
retire the Oilers nickname and trademark.109 The decision
prohibited any future team from taking the name and allowed the
new Titans franchise to retain the history, traditions, and records
of the Oilers.110
After being deserted by its former team, the City of Houston
was awarded the thirty-second NFL franchise in late 1999.111 The
newly minted Houston Texans played their inaugural NFL
season in 2002.112
The relocation of the Browns and Oilers franchises followed
two different paths and resulted in two different outcomes. 113
106. See Leone, supra note 69, at 486 (“Nashville lured the Oilers from
Houston with a promise of a $292 million stadium with 65,000–70,000 seats,
120 luxury suites, and 12,000–14,000 premium club seats.”).
107. See CBSNews.com Staff, Oilers Change Name to Titans, CBS NEWS
(Nov. 14, 1998), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/oilers-change-name-to-titans/
(last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (noting that Tennessee fans did not initially embrace
the Oilers, who played their first season in the City of Memphis and their
second in Nashville’s Vanderbilt Stadium) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
108. See id. (describing the process of deciding upon a new nickname for the
franchise, which included input from prominent state officials and business
executives).
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also Lindsay, supra note 97, at 915 (mentioning that the
decision to retire the Oilers’ nickname received some backlash from prominent
members of the Houston community, including “legendary Oilers coach Bum
Phillips”).
111. See id. (revealing that the City of Houston defeated the City of Los
Angeles to obtain the honor of becoming the host city of the newest NFL
franchise).
112. See Bradley J. Stein, How the Home Team Can Keep from Getting
Sacked: A City’s Best Defense to Franchise Free Agency in Professional Football,
5 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 7 (2003) (“[T]he city of Houston was awarded an
expansion franchise by the NFL to ‘compensate’ the city for the loss of the
Oilers.”).
113. See Leone, supra note 69, at 503–04 (arguing that the Oilers move
seemed more justified than other relocations because the team remained in
Houston until the end of its lease obligation, efforts to keep the team garnered
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While a substantial amount of conflict characterized the Browns’
relocation, the efforts of the City of Cleveland resulted in a small,
albeit significant, victory.114 The City of Houston, in contrast, did
not threaten the Oilers with legal action aimed at blocking the
franchise from moving.115 Considering the history of franchise
relocation in the NFL since the beginning of the franchise free
agency era, this is somewhat surprising.116
C. The 2010s: Return to Los Angeles
On January 12, 2016, the NFL confirmed its return to Los
Angeles, California.117 The second largest city and television
market in the United States, Los Angeles has not been home to a
professional football team in over twenty years, since both the
Raiders and Rams departed for Oakland and St. Louis
respectively.118 Though the NFL periodically considered a return
to Los Angeles, multiple efforts ultimately stalled.119 However, in
little fan support, and, at the time, the stadium was over thirty years old).
114. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text (describing the result
of negotiations between the Browns, the NFL, and officials from both cities).
115. See supra notes 106–110 and accompanying text (explaining events
that transpired after the relocation of the Houston Oilers franchise).
116. See supra Part II.A (discussing eminent domain actions filed against
the Raiders and Colts franchises to prevent their relocation).
117. See Nick Wagoner, Rams, Chargers, Raiders File with NFL for
Relocation
to
Los
Angeles,
ESPN
(Jan.
5,
2016),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/14505636/st-louis-rams-san-diego-chargersoakland-raiders-file-los-angeles-relocation (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (reporting
on the relocation applications of the Oakland Raiders, San Diego Chargers, and
St. Louis Rams to relocate to Los Angeles, California, which were filed following
the end of the 2015 regular season) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
118. Both the Rams and Raiders relocated from Los Angeles, California,
following the 1994 NFL season. See Rams Headed Back to Los Angeles; Chargers
Have
Option
to
Join,
ESPN
(Jan.
13,
2016),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/14558668/st-louis-rams-relocate-los-angeles (last
visited Apr. 18, 2016) (discussing the relocation of the Rams organization to Los
Angeles, California, for the 2016 NFL season) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). The Rams moved to St. Louis, Missouri, and the Raiders went
to Oakland, California. Id. Though the Rams organization was founded in
Cleveland, Ohio, the franchise resided in Los Angeles, California, from 1946–
1994. Id. During that time period, the team earned twenty-one playoff
appearances and one NFL title. Id.
119. See id. (“For more than two decades, billionaire developers, corporate
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accordance with the NFL’s Policy and Procedures for Proposed
Franchise Relocations, three franchises filed applications for
relocation following the 2015 regular season.120 One team, the St.
Louis Rams, proposed building a domed stadium in Inglewood,
California, which could also house a second franchise.121
Alternatively, the Oakland Raiders and the San Diego Chargers
proposed building an outdoor stadium together in Carson,
California.122
After vetting by various committees, including the NFL’s
Committee on Los Angeles Opportunities,123 League officials
titans, Hollywood power-brokers[,] and four Los Angeles mayors tried and failed
to bring the National Football League back to the nation’s second-largest
market.”).
120. See Around the NFL Staff, Rams, Chargers, Raiders Apply for L.A.
Relocation,
NFL
(Jan.
4,
2016),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000617813/article/rams-chargersraiders-apply-for-la-relocation (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (reporting that, in
accordance with the NFL’s relocation policies, three teams submitted
applications to move to Los Angeles) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
121. In January 2014, Rams owner Stan Kroenke acquired approximately
sixty acres of land in Inglewood, California, for an estimated $101 million. See
Sam Farmer & Nathan Fenno, NFL Will Return to Los Angeles for 2016 Season,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/sports/nfl/la-sp-nfl-lachargers-rams-20160113-story.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (reporting on the
NFL’s approval of the Rams’ relocation and numerous behind the scenes efforts
to send a team back to Los Angeles) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). The property is adjacent to 238 acres of land owned by San Franciscobased developer Stockbridge Capital Group. Id. A year after Kroenke’s land
purchase, the Los Angeles Times reported that Kroenke and Stockbridge
Capital Group partnered to build a new NFL stadium on the Inglewood property
owned by Kroenke. Id. Developers envision transforming the entire 298-acre site
into a “multibillion-dollar entertainment, retail[,] and housing complex.” Id. The
entire project will be privately financed, with the “stadium and a performing
arts venue as the centerpiece.” Id.
122. See id. (noting that the Rams’ relocation and stadium proposal faced
competition; the Chargers and Raiders proposed to build a $1.7 billion stadium
on 157-acres in Carson, California).
123. Commissioner Roger Goodell formed the Committee on Los Angeles
Opportunities in January 2015 to “evaluate the various stadium options
available in Los Angeles, oversee the application of the relocation guidelines in
the event that one or more clubs seek to move to Los Angeles, ensure proper
coordination with other standing committees . . . and confirm that all steps
taken in Los Angeles are consistent with the Constitution and Bylaws and NFL
policies.” See Dan Hanzus, NFL Forms Committee on Los Angeles Opportunities,
NFL
(Jan.
9,
2015),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000469646/article/roger-goodell-forms-
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slated the relocation proposals for a final vote.124 On January 12,
2016, the NFL’s thirty-two owners accepted the Rams’ proposal
by a vote of thirty-to-two, allowing the franchise to relocate to Los
Angeles for the 2016 season.125 The vote also gave the “San Diego
Chargers a one-year option to join the Rams in Inglewood.”126 If
the Chargers forfeit their option to join the Rams by January 15,
2017, the Raiders will have a one-year option to move to
Inglewood.127 While franchise owners applauded the outcome,128
the move reflects the failure of negotiations between the City of
St. Louis and the Rams organization.129

committee-on-la-opportunities (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (reporting on a memo
sent to all thirty-two NFL franchises, notifying owners of the committee’s
formation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The committee
consisted of six franchise owners, including Clark Hunt, Robert Kraft, John
Mara, Bob McNair, Jerry Richardson, and Art Rooney. Id.
124. See Ken Belson, A Primer on the N.F.L. Relocating a Team to Los
Angeles,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
10,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/sports/football/nfl-los-angeles-relocationvote-oakland-san-diego-st-louis.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 18, 2016)
(explaining the role of the NFL’s Committee on Los Angeles Opportunities in
vetting the proposals for relocation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
125. Id. According to the NFL’s Constitution and Bylaws, relocation
approval requires an “affirmative vote of three-fourths of the existing member
clubs of the League.” See CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE,
art.
IV,
§
3
(rev.
2006),
http://www.leg.state.mn.us/webcontent/lrl/issues/footballstadium/nflfranchiserel
ocationrules.pdf (outlining the basic requirements for franchise relocation).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Jim Thomas, NFL Owners Thrilled by Kroenke’s Move, ST. LOUIS
DISPATCH
(Jan.
13,
2016),
http://www.stltoday.com/sports/football/professional/cowboys-owner-jerry-jonesexults-in-rams-relocation/article_09762b03-a87e-5c6b-a9fa-250bb46450ae.html
(last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (quoting Jerry Jones, the owner of the Dallas
Cowboys, who called the approval of the move “absolutely the greatest plan that
has ever been conceived in sports”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
129. See Belson, supra note 124 (mentioning efforts by the cities of Oakland,
St. Louis, and San Diego to prevent their teams from relocating).
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D. What Does This Mean for Modern Franchise Free Agency?
Presently, the City of St. Louis faces the same dilemma once
confronted by the cities of Oakland and Baltimore in the 1980s,
and the cities of Cleveland and Houston in the 1990s.130 The
terms of the NFL’s relocation vote in January 2016 also
potentially implicates the cities of San Diego and Oakland.131
With multiple NFL franchise relocations resulting in significant
controversy, the present situation begs the question: Will cities
faced with franchise relocation take measures to protect the
community’s interests? If so, by what means?
After the Oakland and Baltimore litigation, no other city has
attempted to seize an NFL franchise by eminent domain.132 While
the courts ruled against the cities of Oakland and Baltimore, it is
unclear whether another eminent domain action would succeed
given the expansion in takings jurisprudence.133 Moreover, it is
unclear whether an eminent domain action could seize a moving
franchise’s trademarks given the propertization of trademarks
and other forms of intellectual property.134

130. See supra notes 117–127 and accompanying text (summarizing the
approved relocation of the Rams franchise from St. Louis, Missouri to Los
Angeles, California).
131. See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text (explaining that the
NFL’s vote permitting the Rams to move to Los Angeles also gives the San
Diego Chargers a one-year option to join the Rams in Inglewood, which is then
extended to the Oakland Raiders if the Chargers remain in San Diego).
132. See Leone, supra note 69, at 506 (describing the inability of a city to
protect its interests from franchise free agency).
133. See Ellen Z. Mufson, Note, Jurisdictional Limitations on Intangible
Property in Eminent Domain: Focus on the Indianapolis Colts, 60 IND. L.J. 389,
389–411 (1984) (describing historical uncertainty surrounding the question of
whether intangible property may be seized by eminent domain); see also
Portner, supra note 39, at 548–51 (examining the status of the public use
requirement and applying it to sports franchises).
134. A significant development in takings jurisprudence involves the
widening of the public use language in the Takings Clause to encompass takings
that transfer private property from one owner to another for a public purpose,
which occurred two decades after the courts struck down the eminent domain
actions of Oakland and Baltimore. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 489 (2005) (describing the deference given to legislative determinations of
public use).
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III. The Takings Clause and Intangible Property Rights

This Part provides an overview of general takings law and its
applications.135 It then discusses the implications of extending the
Takings Clause to personal property under Horne v. Department
of Agriculture.136 Lastly, it considers the underexplored issue of
whether the Takings Clause encompasses intangible intellectual
property rights, including trademarks.137
A. A Short History of the “Public Use” Requirement
The final clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution states, “[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”138 The Takings Clause
bars the “[g]overnment from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.”139
James Madison, the drafter of the Fifth Amendment,
recognized the ability of the political majority to suppress
minority groups and feared the power of government.140 Prior to
independence, eighteenth-century colonial legislatures took
135. See infra Part III.A–B (summarizing the history of the Takings Clause
and its jurisprudence).
136. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2435–33 (2015)
(concluding that the Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay just
compensation when it takes personal property, just as when it takes “real”
property); infra Part III.C (explaining the Court’s rationale).
137. See infra Part III.D (discussing the implications of the Court’s decision
in Horne for intellectual property rights).
138. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
139. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (involving a
shipbuilder’s default on its contract to construct certain boats for the United
States, and where the government, exercising an option under the contract,
required the shipbuilder to transfer to the government title to the uncompleted
boats and the materials on hand for their construction).
140. See William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 708–13
(1985) (explaining that, because James Madison believed that the right to
property was a manifestation of positive law, erecting strong safeguards for
property rights was of critical importance); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at
370 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that “government is
instituted no less for the protection of the property, than of the persons of
individuals”).
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private property without providing any compensation to the
owner.141 Embracing the emerging ideals of liberalism, Madison
structured the Takings Clause to impose two restrictions on the
government’s ability to take private property.142 First, it requires
that the government take property only for a “public use.”143
Second, the Takings Clause constrains government seizures of
property by imposing fiscal burdens for such activity.144 More
precisely, the government must pay a property owner “just
compensation” whenever (1) a state actor, (2) authorized by law,
(3) effectuates a taking, (4) of a private actor’s property, (5) for a
valid public use.145
Similar to other constitutional provisions, the Takings
Clause establishes only broad principles necessitating judicial

141. See Treanor, supra note 140, at 695 (illustrating that “neither colonial
statutes nor the first state constitutions recognized a right to receive
compensation when the government took property from an individual”). But cf.
Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2426 (describing legislation passed by multiple colonial
legislatures to protect against uncompensated takings of personal property for
public use or service).
142. Scholars are split as to whether the original understanding of the
Takings Clause applied only to government seizures of private property, or
whether it also encompassed regulatory takings. Compare RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 196 (1985)
(advocating an expansive interpretation of the Takings Clause to require
compensation for virtually every interference with an individual’s existing set of
property rights), with Treanor, supra note 140, at 791–97 (contending that the
original understanding of the Takings Clause included only physical seizures of
property by the government).
143. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.” (emphasis added)).
144. See id. (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” (emphasis added)). If the government is obligated to pay just
compensation under the Takings Clause, it is unlikely to seize property unless
the value of the public use outweighs the market value of the property. See
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1373 (Fed Cir. 2006) (Plager, J.,
dissenting) (“By requiring just compensation the Constitution . . . places a
constraint on government action by imposing the cost of such action on the
Government’s fisc, thus subjecting administrative action to the discipline of
public decision-making and legislative authorization.”), reh’g en banc denied,
464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317,
1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Michael W. McConnell, The Raisin Case, 2015 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 313, 314–15 (2015) (describing the logic of the Takings Clause).
145. See Cotter, supra note 26, at 535 (summarizing the elements of a
takings claim).
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interpretation when applied to particular facts.146 The text of the
Takings
Clause
leaves
three
critical
questions
unanswered: (1) What constitutes a “taking;”147 (2) What qualifies
as a “public use;”148 and (3) What is the appropriate measure for
“just compensation”?149
A significant development in takings jurisprudence is the
adoption of a broad interpretation of public use.150 In 1984, the
Supreme Court clarified the expansive nature of the Takings
Clause.151 In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,152 the Court
held that a state could use the eminent domain process to take
privately held land and redistribute it to a wider population of
private residents.153 The case involved a challenge to Hawaii’s
Land Reform Act of 1967,154 which sought to reduce the
concentration of land ownership.155 The problem resulted from a
146. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 803–10 (1995)
(discussing modern understandings of the Takings Clause and how it differs
from early, historical interpretations).
147. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378–79 (1945)
(defining the term “taken” within the Fifth Amendment expansively to cover,
not only substitution of ownership, but also deprivation of ownership, including
damage to, depreciation in value of, and destruction of property).
148. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954) (clarifying that the
concept of public welfare, which influences determinations of public use,
represents spiritual values as well as physical, aesthetic, and monetary values).
149. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 237–38 (2003)
(explaining that just compensation is measured in terms of loss to the owner,
which is determined by fair market value); see also Bost. Chamber of Commerce
v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910) (declaring that the appropriate measure of
just compensation is “what the owner has lost, not what the taker has gained”).
150. See Dustin Marlan, Trademark Takings: Trademarks As Constitutional
Property Under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1581, 1587–91 (2013) (commenting on the development of takings jurisprudence
and the expansion of the public use language in the Takings Clause).
151. See Public Use-Economic Development, 119 HARV. L. REV. 287, 287
(2005) (“For over a century, courts have adopted a broad view of what
constitutes a ‘public use’ for purposes of the Takings Clause.”).
152. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
153. See id. at 232–36 (considering a Hawaii statute whereby fee title was
taken from lessors and transferred to lessees, for just compensation, with the
goal of reducing the concentration of private land ownership).
154. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 516–22 (1976) (codifying the Land Reform Act of
1967).
155. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232 (noting that previous efforts to divide
Hawaiian lands proved unsuccessful).
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feudal land tenure system, which did not recognize the concept of
fee simple ownership.156 Consequently, a handful of individuals
owned a large percentage of the land available for residential
development.157 To alleviate this problem, the Land Reform Act
authorized a redistribution of fee simple titles from the few
landowners to private residents, who were often lessors, through
the power of eminent domain.158
The Court held that, if a compensated taking is rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose, then the taking is
constitutional.159 Therefore, if the government rationally believes
that a taking will promote a valid objective, it will satisfy the
public use requirement.160 In the years following Midkiff, the
Public Use Clause did not impose a significant impediment to
state and local efforts to condemn private property.161 Courts
exhibited substantial deference to legislative determinations that
particular uses of property served an appropriate municipal
function.162 As a result, public-private urban redevelopment
efforts intensified.163
156. See id. (explaining that, during extensive hearings, the Hawaii
legislature concluded that concentrated land ownership skewed the State’s
residential fee simple market, inflated land prices, and “injured the public
tranquility and welfare”).
157. See id. (reporting that, although the State and Federal Governments
owned approximately 49% of the State’s land, seventy-two private landowners
owned 47% of Hawaiian lands).
158. See id. at 232–34 (describing the title transfer process that the Land
Reform Act of 1967 implemented).
159. See id. at 230 (noting that condemnations and private-to-private
transfers are constitutional under the Takings Clause so long as they are
“rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”).
160. See id. at 244–45 (explaining that, although a purely private
government taking cannot withstand the Fifth Amendment scrutiny, courts are
highly deferential to the legislature in the determination of whether a taking
will serve a public use).
161. See, e.g., Lynn E. Blais, The Problem with Pretext, 38 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 963, 965 (2011) (illustrating that the Midkiff decision embraced a wide
range of public purposes); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61, 61 (1986) (“In practice . . . most observers today think that
the public use limitation is a dead letter.”).
162. See Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 550–52
(2009) (describing that many states engage in the controversial practice of
partnering with or employing private development corporations to condemn
property for redevelopment projects).
163. See Blais, supra note 161, at 966–67 (noting that the Midkiff decision
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More recently, the Court held that the condemnation and
transfer of property from one private actor to another private
actor as part of a “comprehensive redevelopment plan” was a
public use.164 In Kelo v. City of New London, the Court addressed
the City of New London’s authority to seize private residential
property to sell to private developers.165 This was done in
accordance with the City’s comprehensive development plan,
which included the expected arrival of a new research facility,
constructed by pharmaceutical giant Pfizer.166
The Court largely focused on the City of New London’s
planning and projected economic growth.167 The City claimed that
the associated public benefits were neither incidental nor
pretextual and satisfied the Fifth Amendment.168 The majority
agreed in a 5-to-4 decision.169 According to the Court,
“[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long
accepted function of government”170 that cannot be distinguished
from a public purpose.171
permitted state and local governments to expand the scope of redevelopment
projects “beyond slum clearance and urban renewal to urban revitalization and
redevelopment”).
164. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480–81 (2005)
(illustrating that, historically, the Court has interpreted the Takings Clause as
being broad and inclusive as to what public needs satisfy the public use
requirement).
165. See id. at 475 (noting that, after negotiations with several residents
failed, the City initiated condemnation proceedings and claimed the land as its
own).
166. See id. (noting that the City of New London did not claim that the
properties were “blighted or otherwise in poor condition”).
167. See id. at 480–82 (describing that resolution turned on whether the
City of New London’s economic development plan accomplished a “public
purpose,” defined broadly, and with deference to legislative judgments (citing
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 266 (1954); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229 (1984))).
168. See id. at 478 (explaining that the Public Use Clause prohibits
transfers of private property with only incidental or pretextual public benefits).
169. See id. at 483–84 (characterizing the City of New London’s economic
development plan as “comprehensive,” and concluding that the proposed plan
and taking undeniably served a public purpose).
170. Id. at 484.
171. See id. (“There is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing
economic development from the other public purposes that we have
recognized.”).
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The Supreme Court’s holding in Kelo remains controversial
and resulted in an unprecedented political backlash, including
state legislative action.172 The decision is significant, however, for
reaffirming the broad nature of the public use requirement.173
Post-Kelo, two categories of public use are widely recognized
as valid: First, the Fifth Amendment clearly authorizes
government to take private property without consent if it is to be
used by the government for general public benefit.174 Second, the
government is authorized to transfer private property to another
private entity, provided that the transfer is for a public rather
than private purpose and that there is no provision of state law
that prohibits such conduct.175
B. Taking Property: The Per Se Rule
Seizures of property under the Takings Clause fall into one of
three categories: per se (possessory) takings,176 regulatory
takings,177 or judicial takings.178 In the context of professional
172. For a comprehensive account of state legislative responses to Kelo, see
Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J. F. 82, 84
(2015) (noting that, in the years after Kelo, a total of forty-seven states
increased protection against takings for private use through constitutional,
legislative, or judicial action); D. Zachary Hudson, Note, Eminent Domain
Process, 119 YALE L.J. 1280, 1282 (2010) (“[M]any states altered their eminent
domain statutes or amended their constitutions to ensure that economic
development could not serve as a legitimate basis for exercising the state’s
eminent domain power.”).
173. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487–90 (2005)
(illustrating that a ruling in favor of petitioners would represent a departure
from prior precedents).
174. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.” (emphasis added)).
175. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479–80 (interpreting the “public use” language of
the Takings Clause to encompass “public purpose”).
176. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427
(1982) (noting that the Court has consistently found a taking when faced with a
constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real property).
177. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(challenging an alleged regulatory taking, which is a less obvious type of taking
that results from government regulations that have a significant adverse effect
on an individual’s use and enjoyment of land). The Penn Central Court
developed a three-factor balancing test that determines whether a government
regulation amounts to a regulatory taking. Id. at 123. The factors
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sports franchises, however, a successful exercise of eminent
domain power against a team implicates only the doctrines
associated with per se takings.179 The taking would not subject a
private owner to restrictions on the ability to use, develop, or
dispose of team property.180 Additionally, the exercise of eminent
domain in this context would not involve a court declaration that
“what was once an established right of private property no longer
exists.”181 Rather, attempted seizures of professional sports
franchises involve a municipality’s desire to acquire all property
rights associated with ownership.182 Following the payment of
just compensation to the appropriate party, eminent domain
effectively transfers title from a private party to the
government.183

include: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations, and (3) the character of the government action. See, e.g., Connolly
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986) (restating the Penn
Central balancing test).
178. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
560 U.S. 702, 715 (2010) (plurality opinion) (breathing life into the doctrine of
judicial takings—the concept that judicial decisions, similar to other
government actions, might be deemed to take property rights under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment). In that case, petitioners challenged the
Supreme Court of Florida’s determination that, under state law, depositing sand
on eroded beaches constituted an avulsion whereby ownership accrued to the
state. Id. at 711–12. In a plurality decision, the Supreme Court declared that, if
“a court declares that what was once an established right of private property no
longer exists, it has taken that property.” Id. at 714–15.
179. See Lindsay, supra note 97, at 937 (recognizing that historical attempts
to seize a professional sports franchise have involved efforts to acquire complete
ownership of all team property (emphasis added)).
180. See Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings: One
Distinction Too Many, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 101 (2012) (asserting that
major regulatory initiatives undertaken by the government “rarely require a
penny in compensation for millions of dollars in economic losses”).
181. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 714–15 (2010).
182. See, e.g., Raiders IV, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 155 (1985) (noting that the
City of Oakland sought, among other things, to condemn the intangible property
rights associated with the Raiders franchise); Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 282 (D. Md. 1985)
(“As a preliminary matter, the Court points out that it is now beyond dispute
that intangible property is properly the subject of condemnation proceedings.”).
183. See Leone, supra note 69, at 506 (“Both Baltimore and Oakland
attempted to take title to their teams through eminent domain.”).
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The Supreme Court has found per se takings when (1) the
government physically seizes private property, which results in a
permanent physical occupation,184 and (2) when a government
regulation results in the loss of all economically beneficial or
productive use of property.185 A permanent physical seizure of
private property, however, does not mean forever.186 All takings
are “temporary” at some level because the government may
relinquish control of the property at a later time.187 This is true
regardless of the type of property taken or the method of
seizure.188
C. Taking Personal Property
The Fifth Amendment protects multiple forms of property
other than real property.189 At its historical core, the Takings
Clause protects physical property.190 This category of property
includes both real property and personal property.191 According to
184. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 441 (1982) (determining that a government-sanctioned, “permanent
physical occupation of property” is a taking, regardless of the reason for the
government’s taking).
185. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)
(determining that, if a government regulation eliminates all economically
beneficial or productive use of privately owned land in the name of the common
good, that is, to leave the owner’s property economically idle, the owner has
suffered a taking which requires just compensation).
186. See Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(describing that the term “‘permanent’ does not mean forever, or anything like
it,” and that a government taking for a limited period of time does not absolve
the government of its liability).
187. See id. (clarifying that the government may return condemned property
to its original owner or otherwise release its interest through other means).
188. See id. (explaining that physical takings of property through
condemnation and easements by virtue of regulations do not necessarily
continue into perpetuity).
189. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04 (1984)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment protects trade secrets, an intangible form of
intellectual property, from uncompensated government seizures).
190. See Treanor, supra note 140, at 708–13 (describing Madison’s rationale
for the Fifth Amendment, which included a desire to ensure the protection of
physical property).
191. See id. (arguing that Madison’s writings reveal a commitment to
protecting both personal and real property).
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the Supreme Court, Takings Clause protection extends to a range
of real property interests, including fee simple estates,
leaseholds,192 easements,193 and mortgages.194 Additionally, it
encompasses multiple intangible property rights.195 But, as the
Supreme Court stated in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,196 the Takings Clause affords less protection to personal
property than real property.197 According to the Lucas Court,
traditional understandings of property rights permitted a
distinction between the two types of property.198
In 2015, the Supreme Court rebutted this presumption and
held that personal property is constitutionally protected private
property under the Takings Clause.199 The case, Horne v.
Department of Agriculture (The Raisin Case), involved a
challenge to a federal scheme designed to stabilize the market for
several agricultural products, including raisins.200 The program
192. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378–79 (1945)
(concerning condemnation proceedings initiated to procure temporary use of
property held under a long-term lease by General Motors Corporation).
193. See United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 339 (1910) (treating the
taking of an easement as a physical appropriation of land).
194. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601–02
(1935) (finding that an amendment to federal bankruptcy law providing for the
scaling down of mortgage debts without the full repayment of the loans that
they secured violated the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause).
195. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04 (1984)
(holding that trade secrets constitute constitutionally protected private property
under the Takings Clause); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 164–65 (1980) (finding that the Takings Clause protects the right to
retain the interest earned on principal); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571,
579 (1934) (determining that valid contracts constitute Fifth Amendment
property).
196. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
197. See id. at 1014, 1027–28 (describing the historical concern with
physical appropriations and their equivalents).
198. See id. (analyzing the perceived difference in the bundle of rights
associated with real and personal property).
199. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2425–33 (2015)
(concluding that the Fifth Amendment requires that the Government pay just
compensation when it takes personal property, just as when it takes real
property).
200. The Agriculture Marketing Act of 1937 authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture to promulgate “marketing orders,” which set quotas for certain
agricultural products. Id. at 2424. The Raisin Administrative Committee, a
government entity, determined the required allocation of individual growers. Id.
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prohibited raisin growers from placing a certain percentage of
their crop into the market and fined growers for
noncompliance.201 It also required raisin growers to deliver these
“reserve raisins” to a governmental body (Raisin Committee).202
Without paying any compensation, the Raisin Committee
subsequently acquired title to the reserve raisins and disposed of
them at its discretion.203 Raisin growers retained a proportional,
contingent interest in the value of raisins reserved for the
government if the proceeds exceeded the administrative costs of
the Raisin Committee.204
Citing understandings of property law dating back to the
Magna Carta,205 the Court concluded that Fifth Amendment
protections equally apply to both personal property and real
property.206 According to the Court, nothing in the text, history,
or logic of the Takings Clause permitted any other
interpretation.207 Applying this understanding to the facts, the
Earlier in the litigation, Justice Elena Kagan referred to the California raisin
statute “the world’s most outdated law.” See Transcript of Oral Argument at 40,
49, Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013) (No. 12-123) (addressing a
procedural aspect of the case). Justice Antonin Scalia agreed, calling it “a crazy
statute.” Id.
201. Petitioners grew and produced raisins. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2424. After
refusing to comply with the set-aside requirement, the Government assessed a
fine of $483,843.53 against the Hornes. Id. at 2433. This fine allegedly
represented the market value of the missing raisins. Id. at 2425. The
government also assessed “an additional civil penalty of just over $200,000 for
disobeying the order to turn them over.” Id.
202. See id. at 2424 (describing that the Raisin Committee ordered raisin
growers to set aside 47% of their crop from 2002–2003 and 30% from 2003–
2004).
203. See id. (explaining that, once title is acquired, the Raisin Committee
sells the reserve raisins in noncompetitive markets, donates them to charity,
releases them to growers who agree to reduce their production, or disposes of
them by other means consistent with the purposes of the program).
204. The government characterized the proportional interest retained by
growers as the “the most important property interest” in the reserve raisins. Id.
at 2428–29. Therefore, they argued that no Fifth Amendment taking occurred.
Id. at 2429.
205. See id. at 2426 (illustrating that the principles reflected in the Takings
Clause go back “at least 800 years to Magna Carta, which specifically protected
agricultural crops from uncompensated takings”).
206. See id. at 2426 (“[T]he Government has a categorical duty to pay just
compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home.”).
207. See id. (commenting on arbitrary and oppressive appropriations of
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Court determined that the regulatory reserve requirement
imposed on raisin growers was a possessory per se taking, which
required just compensation.208
D. Taking Intangible Intellectual Property
Prior to The Raisin Case, the Supreme Court never directly
addressed the question of whether the Takings Clause applied to
property other than real property.209 An explanation offered by
one scholar is, essentially, that “no one ever doubted that the
Takings Clause [applied] fully to personal property.”210 However,
The Raisin Case unequivocally concludes, as the majority wrote,
that “[t]he Government has a categorical duty to pay just
compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your
home.”211
At first glance, the Court’s opinion seems to examine only the
application of the Takings Clause to personal property, ignoring
any potential implications on intellectual property interests.212
personal property during the Revolutionary War, which likely influence the
inclusion of the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment).
208. See id. at 2427–28 (concluding that the reserve requirement imposed on
raisin growers constituted a “clear physical taking”). The Court also addressed
two more issues presented by The Raisin Case. See id. at 2425 (“The petition for
certiorari poses three questions, which we answer in turn.”). The government
claimed that there was no taking because growers retained an important
property interest in the reserve raisins: the contingent interest in net proceeds.
Id. at 2428–30. It also argued that the government program operated as a valid
condition on permission to engage in commerce. Id. at 2429–30. The Court did
not find either of the government’s arguments compelling. Id. at 2430–31. It
reiterated, however, that raisins are private property and that any physical
taking of them for public use requires just compensation. Id.
209. See McConnell, supra note 144, at 322–23 (illustrating that the
Supreme Court had previously applied the Takings Clause (in its per se form) to
personal property, including patents, steamboats, machinery, and money, but
that it did so without explanation).
210. See id. at 322 (noting the surprising nature of the Ninth Circuit’s
holding that per se takings rules did not apply to personal property because
nothing in the “text history or logic of the Takings Clause suggest otherwise”).
211. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015); see also
McConnell, supra note 144, at 317 (noting that no dissenting justice challenged
this interpretation of the Takings Clause).
212. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2425–33 (discussing why the Takings Clause
extends to personal property as well as real property).
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However, the Court’s opinion briefly mentions the protections
that the Taking Clause provides for patents.213 Addressing the
history of the Takings Clause, the Court reiterated that a patent
manifests an exclusive property interest in the patented
invention, held by the patentee.214 Such a property interest
“cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without
just compensation.”215 The Court then analogized the exclusive
property interest created by a patent to interests in real property,
held by a private purchaser.216 But, aside from utilizing a
discussion of the property interests created by patents to
illustrate the development of takings jurisprudence, the Court did
not delve further into a discussion of intangible intellectual
property interests.217
As takings jurisprudence makes clear, the Takings Clause,
and the associated constitutional protections it affords, is most
often applied to real or tangible property.218 However, this reality
should not prohibit courts from applying the Takings Clause to
intangible
property.219
In
fact,
takings
jurisprudence
demonstrates a commitment to protecting many forms of property
besides real property.220 This makes the fact that the Court’s
213. See id. at 2427 (noting the constitutional protection of patents to make
the assertion that personal property is “no less protected against physical
appropriation than real property”).
214. See id. (citing James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881) (concerning
the U.S. Post Office’s alleged appropriation of a patent, which was obtained for
an improved postmarking or stamping machine)).
215. Id.
216. See id. (“[A patent] confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in
the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government
itself, without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use
without compensation land which has been patented to a private purchaser.”).
217. See id. at 2427–28 (discussing the Court’s takings jurisprudence and
disagreement with the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between real and personal
property).
218. See Cotter, supra note 26, at 536 (noting that the vast majority of
Supreme Court decisions regarding the Takings Clause concern actions initiated
in response to government takings of real, as opposed to personal or intangible,
property).
219. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984)
(holding that trade secrets are protected under the Takings Clause).
220. For a discussion of the historical protections afforded to patents, see
Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical
Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 700–11
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opinion in The Raisin Case expressly relies on a patent case to
support a broad reading of the word “property” in the Fifth
Amendment rather curious.221 The Court could have utilized
language from another case to establish the broad nature of
property rights, but it did not.222 Additionally, the Court has
never held that the Takings Clause directly applies to patents.223
Taken together, these realities strongly suggest that
constitutional property is not limited to tangible property rights
and that the current Court considers intellectual property rights
protected by the Takings Clause.
IV. Types of Intellectual Property
This Part provides a brief overview of the four major
categories of intellectual property rights—trade secrets, patents,
copyrights, and trademarks—and how the private property
interests of each differ.224 Additionally, it introduces whether the
property interests of each qualify as constitutional property for
purposes of the Takings Clause.225

(2007) (examining the judicial and legislative records and arguing that
nineteenth-century courts, “enthusiastically applied the Takings Clause to
patents”). But, as Mossoff’s Article describes, modern courts and scholars have
obscured the constitutional proposition that patents are private property rights
secured under the Constitution. Id. at 711–24.
221. See supra notes 212–217 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court’s use of a nineteenth-century patent case to illustrate the
development of takings jurisprudence).
222. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003 (noting that property “extends
beyond land and tangible goods and includes the products of an individual’s
‘labour and invention’”).
223. Rather, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated
that patents are not constitutionally protected property under the Takings
Clause. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III), 442 F.3d 1345, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (concluding that the government’s uses of a patented
invention or method is not a seizure of any property interest belonging to the
patentee), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and
vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
224. See infra Part IV.A–D (differentiating between the four major
categories of intellectual property and the property rights associated with each).
225. See infra Part IV.A–D (illustrating that, while trade secrets receive
heightened protection under the Takings Clause, the application of the Takings
Clause to other categories of intellectual property is unclear).
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A. Trade Secrets
“A trade secret is any information that can be used in the
operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently
valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic
advantage over others.”226 The bundle of rights associated with
trade secrets is defined by the extent to which the owner protects
his interest from disclosure to others.227 Though state laws
primarily govern trade secrets,228 they receive heightened
constitutional protection under the Takings Clause.229
B. Patents
The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”230 Under this power,
Congress has the right to enact various laws regarding patents,
which are exclusive property rights in certain types of inventions

226. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST.
1995); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939)
(defining trade secrets as “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one’s business, and that gives one an opportunity
to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it”).
227. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (AM. LAW INST.
1995) (stating that, among other things, the owner of a trade secret may exclude
others from acquiring the secret by “improper means,” or from using or
disclosing the secret if the other knew, or had reason to know, that the
circumstances of disclosure gave rise to a duty to maintain secrecy).
228. See Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets
Under the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 58 (2004) (“Unlike patents and
copyrights, trade secrets are protected primarily by state law rules, with some
limited federal protection thrown into the mix.”); Christopher B. Seaman, The
Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 317, 330–38 (2015)
(describing that, although state laws generally govern trade secrets, a
significant body of federal statutory law is potentially applicable to the growing
issue of trade secret theft).
229. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04 (1984)
(holding that trade secrets associated with the development of an agrochemical
product were property under Missouri law and, thus, protected against
confiscation under the Takings Clause).
230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

38

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2016)

and other useful information.231 While Congress enacted the first
patent law in 1790,232 the present Patent Act states that, once
granted, a patent confers the patentee with an exclusive property
interest for a term of twenty years.233 As recognized by the
Supreme Court, “patent protection strikes a delicate balance
between creating incentives that lead to creation, invention,
discovery, and impeding the flow of information that might
permit, indeed spur, invention.”234
Similar to other types of intellectual property, “[t]he question
that haunts scholars and courts today is whether patents also are
constitutional private property, falling within the ambit of
protections afforded to private property under the Takings
Clause.”235 In 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit provided an answer.236 Despite being considered “private

231. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012) (granting a patentee the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the patented invention in the United
States).
232. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793)
(stating that a patent protects “the sole and exclusive right and liberty of
making, constructing, using and vending to others to be used, the said invention
or discovery”).
233. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (“Subject to the payment of fees under
this title, such grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the
patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the
patent was filed in the United States . . . .”).
234. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107, 2116 (2013) (involving a challenge to the validity of multiple gene patents)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
235. Mossoff, supra note 220, at 690 (internal quotation marks omitted).
236. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III), 442 F.3d 1345, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (concluding that the government’s uses of a patented
invention or method is not a seizure of any property interest belonging to the
patentee), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and
vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Federal
Circuit is particularly influential in the area of patent law because it is the only
federal appellate court with per se jurisdiction over patent appeals. See Holmes
Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 838–39 (2002)
(explaining that, although the Federal Circuit “does not have exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases raising patent issues,” there is an interest in
“directing appeals in patent cases to the specialized court that was created, in
part, to promote uniformity in the development of this area of the law”).
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property interests,”237 the court determined that patents are not
constitutional property under the Takings Clause.238
C. Copyrights
Copyrights, a third form of intellectual property, provide
authors of original works with a bundle of proprietary rights for
limited times.239 Similar to patents, copyrights are also creatures
of federal law.240 A legal scheme enumerated in the Constitution
and developed by Congress, copyright encourages the authorship
and dissemination of original forms of expression.241 As with
other categories of intangible intellectual property, the issue of
applying Takings Clause scrutiny to copyrights is relatively
unexplored by the courts,242 resulting in scholars reaching
different conclusions on the issue.243

237. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (“Subject to the provisions of this title,
patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”).
238. See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1352 (concluding that, because patents are
“creatures of federal law” and not created by “an independent source such as
state law,” they do not receive the protections afforded by the Takings Clause).
239. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (embodying the concept of private ownership
by securing to a copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute,
perform, and display the secured work, as well as the right to prepare derivative
works).
240. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (endowing Congress with the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries”); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006) (codifying United States copyright
law).
241. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 970–77
(1990) (outlining the basics of copyright as a category of private intellectual
property).
242. See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 233
(2002) (stating that the “[a]pplication of the Takings Clause to intellectual
property—trademarks, copyrights and patents—has not yet been seriously
tested in the courts”).
243. Compare Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property Is Created Equal: Why
Modern Courts Resist Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They
Are Right to Do So, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 43 (2007) (arguing that the Zoltek
court’s conclusion was correct and that patents should not trigger Takings
Clause protection), with Cotter, supra note 26, at 532 (concluding that, “on
balance, most federal uses of patents and copyrights probably do implicate the
Takings Clause”).
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D. Trademarks

Fundamentally, trademarks differ from the other categories
of intellectual property protection.244 According to the federal
Lanham Act,245 which governs trademark law, trademarks
include “any word, name, symbol, device or any combination
thereof—(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona
fide intention to use in commerce . . . to identify and distinguish
his or her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others
and to indicate the source of the goods.”246 In contrast to patents,
copyrights, and trade secrets, trademarks do not share the same
underlying purpose of encouraging and rewarding innovation,
physical creation, or original authorship.247 Rather, historical and
modern trademark law is the manifestation of two competing
policy goals: (1) the protection of consumers from deception and
confusion, and (2) the protection of the private property interests
a trademark represents.248
244. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:15 (4th ed. 2012) (“Trademarks, unlike patents and copyrights,
have no existence independent of the good will of the products or services in
connection with which the mark is used.”).
245. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2012) (codifying the Lanham Act, as
amended).
246. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). The United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) is the federal agency responsible for granting U.S. patents and
registering trademarks. Id. § 1051. It derives its authority to register
trademarks from the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See id.
(permitting the application for registration of “a trademark used in commerce”
or of a trademark that a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce).
247. See supra Part IV.A–C (discussing, among other things, the policy goals
associated with patents, copyrights, and trade secrets).
248. Before the Lanham Act’s passage, Congressman Lanham, the bill’s
sponsor, elaborated on the goals of trademark law:
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to
protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product
bearing a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get
the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the
owner of a trademark has spent energy, time, and money in
presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment
from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the wellestablished rule of law protecting both the public and the trademark
owner.
S. Rep. No. 1333, at 3 (1946); see also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed. 2012) (“In the author’s
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Until Congress enacted the first federal trademark statutes
in the late nineteenth century, state common law protected
trademarks.249 Today, trademarks receive federal protection
under the Lanham Act.250 Originally enacted in 1946, the
Lanham Act codifies and expands on years of state common law
trademark traditions.251 Generally, its clauses provide a
registration scheme for trademarks and service marks used in
interstate commerce.252 It also establishes remedies against third
parties for infringement253 and dilution.254 Finally, the Lanham
Act provides federal protection against various acts of unfair
competition, which, among other things, include false advertising,
false designations of origin, and false description or
representation.255
At common law and under the Lanham Act, exclusive use of
a trademark is awarded to the first person to make a lawful,
opinion, to select as paramount either protection of the trademark property or
protection of consumers would be to oversimplify the dual goals of trademark
law, both historical and modern: the protection of both consumers from
deception and confusion and the protection of the trademark as property.”).
249. Congress enacted the first federal trademark statute in 1870, which
anchored protection for the property rights associated with trademarks in the
Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution. See Act of July 8, 1870, 16
Stat. 198 (providing a system of federal registration for all trademarks used
throughout the United States). The Supreme Court later struck down the
Trademark Act of 1870 because it exceeded Congress’s authority under the
Patent and Copyright Clause. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92–94
(1879) (reasoning that the Patent and Copyright Clause did not protect
trademarks because a trademark does not “depend upon novelty, invention,
discovery, or any work of the brain”). The Court also determined that the Act
violated the Commerce Clause because it extended federal protection to
trademarks regardless of whether the mark was used in interstate commerce.
Id. at 97–98.
250. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2012) (codifying U.S. trademark law).
251. See Seaman, supra note 228, at 382–84 (describing the federalization of
trademark law, which ultimately resulted in strengthened trademark rights).
252. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–72 (2012) (outlining registration under the
Principal Register, the primary register of trademarks maintained by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office).
253. See id. §§ 1125(a), 1114 (providing for a federal cause of action for the
infringement of registered marks and unregistered marks).
254. See id. § 1125(c) (codifying the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
and providing a federal cause of action for the dilution of famous marks).
255. See id. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (creating a federal cause of action for various
common-law unfair competition torts).
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commercial use of the mark in commerce.256 This permits the
senior user or owner to exclude others from using the same mark
or a confusingly similar mark.257 Combined with the protections
afforded by trademarks, this exclusionary function safeguards the
economic interests of owners and consumers in the preservation
of brand identity.258
V. Trademarks as Constitutionally Protected Private Property
Trademarks possess many of the qualities of other forms of
constitutionally protected private property.259 The framers of the
Constitution limited the Fifth Amendment guarantee to
property.260 In doing so, they “obliged the Supreme Court to come
up with criteria for identifying those interests that qualify as
property and for excluding others that would fail the test.”261 This
is because neither the Fifth Amendment nor any other
constitutional provision defines what constitutes property.262 As a
result, courts have endeavored to distinguish between those
256. Essentially, an owner acquires the property rights associated with
trademarks through its use in commerce. See id. § 1051(A)(3) (requiring that the
applicant for a trademark believe, in good faith, that they are the first entity to
use the designation as a mark). For competing users of an inherently distinctive
mark, ownership and priority of use goes to the “first entity to use the
designation as a mark.” See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16:1 (4th ed. 2015) (describing trademark priority at
common law, which follows the rule of first-in-time, first-in-right).
257. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1072, 1115 (2012) (stating that registration of
the mark serves as nationwide, constructive notice of ownership and use).
258. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing the underlying
goals of trademark law).
259. See Marlan, supra note 150, at 1599 (arguing that “trademarks possess
the qualities of constitutional property and are therefore subject to the Takings
Clause”).
260. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. (permitting the government to take private
property for public use upon payment of just compensation).
261. See Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the
Misappropriation of Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments
Before and After Seminole Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity
Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849, 857 (1998) (contemplating whether
intellectual property constitutes constitutional property under the Fifth
Amendment).
262. See supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text (describing three
critical questions left unanswered by the Fifth Amendment).
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forms of property that fall outside the bounds of the Fifth
Amendment and those that receive heightened protection from
government seizure.263
Though it is well understood that “[t]he Takings Clause does
not extend equal protection to each form of property it
recognizes,”264 takings jurisprudence is often characterized as a
“muddle.”265 The doctrines utilized to interpret the Takings
Clause are difficult to ascertain, continually evolving, and
sometimes lack theoretical coherence.266 The application of the
Takings Clause to intangible intellectual property rights—which
are distinguishable in numerous ways from the more common
seizure of real property—only complicates the matter further.267
The issue of whether trademarks constitute constitutionally
protected private property under the Fifth Amendment is a
relatively underexplored area of the law.268 However, two
landmark intellectual property cases provide some guidance on
the issue.269 First, in 1984, the Supreme Court held that the
263. See Note, Copyright Reform and the Takings Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV.
973, 976–77 (2015) (“[N]ot all legal rights and privileges amount to property.”).
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart of the Takings
Muddle: Kelo, Lingle, and Public Discourse About Private Property, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 613, 618 (2007) (arguing that, in reaffirming the broad nature of the
Public Use Clause, Kelo may have “paradoxically made it more difficult for state
and local governments to exercise that power, because it only heightened
distrust of municipal actions affecting property”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, The
Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings
“Muddle”, 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 827 (2006) (tracing the roots of the doctrinal
muddle in the context of regulatory takings); Carol M. Rose, Mahon
Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561,
561–62 (1984) (characterizing Takings Clause jurisprudence as “[b]y far the
most intractable constitutional property issue”).
266. See Karkkainen, supra note 265, at 827–33 (introducing the doctrinal
challenges associated with the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence).
267. See Cotter, supra note 26, at 529 (“If the law of takings as applied to
real and personal property is the ‘muddle’ that many commentators insist it is,
the law of taking with regard to intellectual property can only be characterized
as a muddle within the muddle.”).
268. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 242, at 233 (explaining that courts
have not seriously tested the application of the Takings Clause to the various
categories of intellectual property); see also Marlan, supra note 150, at 1599–
1620 (exploring the case for trademarks as constitutionally protected private
property).
269. See infra Part V.B (discussing two judicial decision that concern the
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Takings Clause protects trade secrets.270 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit reached the opposite conclusion
regarding the status of patents.271 Second, in 2006, the Federal
Circuit concluded that “patents, despite being considered private
property interests, are not constitutional property under the
Takings Clause.”272 Utilizing both cases and arguments for and
against the Fifth Amendment’s application to trademarks, this
Part contends that trademarks should be considered
constitutionally protected private property.273
A. Public Goods or Private Property?
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects private
property interests.274 Public goods, on the other hand, do not
qualify
for
constitutional
protection.275
A
common
counterargument to treating trademarks as constitutional
property rests on this latter principle.276

application of the Takings Clause to trade secrets and patents).
270. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984)
(holding that trade secrets constitute property under the Takings Clause).
271. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III), 442 F.3d 1345, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (concluding that the government’s uses of a patented
invention or method is not a seizure of any property interest belonging to the
patentee), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and
vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
272. See Marlan, supra note 150, at 1584 (arguing that trademarks
constitute both legal private property and constitutionally protected property for
the purposes of the Takings Clause).
273. See infra Part V.C (concluding that, based on contemporary judicial
guidance and the propertization of intellectual property, trademarks are
constitutionally protected private property).
274. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.” (emphasis added)).
275. Public goods are non-rivalrous, meaning that, once the good is
produced, many individuals can simultaneously consume that good without
interfering with the consumption opportunities available to others. See David
W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 22,
24 (2006) (rejecting the private goods characterization of trademarks).
276. Recall that trademark law is the manifestation of two competing policy
goals, one of which is the protection of consumers from deception and confusion.
See supra note 248 and accompanying text (describing the historical and modern
goals of trademark law).
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Arguably, traditional property doctrines resist treating
trademarks as private property because restrictive rights in a
mark extend only to its use in conjunction with the sale of goods
and services.277 Essentially, by using a mark to identify and
distinguish his products or services in commerce, the owner of a
mark merely contributes to the store of information available for
consumer use.278 This permits consumers to use a mark in a
beneficial, but non-rivalrous manner.279 Consumers thus may
invoke the communicative, source-indicating value of the mark
without interfering with the mark holder’s rights or those of other
consumers.280 This reality, some argue, erodes the economic
foundation for the propertization of trademarks.281
Trademarks no longer serve a primary function as
“consumer-driven, communicative devices.”282 Those who claim
that trademarks do not constitute constitutionally protected
private property fail to acknowledge the increased treatment of
trademarks as property.283 Undeniably, trademarks serve the
interests of consumers.284 They reduce search costs and create
277. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367,
463 (1999) (disputing the economic foundation for the propertization of
trademarks, and arguing that without legal protections, trademarks are public
goods).
278. See id. at 369 (“By identifying the source of goods, a trademark
provides consumers with information that they need (and cannot otherwise
readily obtain) in order to match their desires to particular products.”).
279. See id. at 28–35 (arguing that the dominant modern theory of
trademark law, which is based on the tendency of consumers to refer or search
for products or services based on recognition of a supplier’s mark, ignores the
public goods character of referential meaning).
280. See Marlan, supra note 150, at 1600 (summarizing the argument that
trademarks constitute public goods).
281. See Lunney, Jr., supra note 277, at 486–87 (“[W]e have divorced
trademark law from its historical and sensible policy focus on the probability of
material confusion, and crafted an overbroad, ill-considered legal regime that
serves simply to enrich certain trademark owners at the expense of
consumers . . . .”).
282. See Marlan, supra note 150, at 1600 (addressing the public goods
counterargument to treating trademarks as private property).
283. See id. at 1603 (“While trademark law’s expansion in the past halfcentury has solidified trademarks as property rights . . . scholars have noted
that even early American trademark law cases focused on the protection of
owners’ trademarks as property.”).
284. See Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 381
(2009) (“Trademark law is guided by market-oriented principles that encourage
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incentives for businesses to ensure the production of quality
products.285 As one scholar proclaimed, “The true functions of the
trademark are . . . to identify a product as satisfactory and
thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming
public.”286
Nevertheless,
increased
propertization
has
characterized the evolution of trademark law throughout the
twentieth century and into the modern era.287 Eclipsing the
consumer protection rationale, the private property-based
functions of trademarks presently dominate.288
B. Contemporary Judicial Guidance
This subpart contends that Takings Clause precedent from
other forms of intellectual property strongly suggests that
trademarks are property rights as well. First, it discusses the
Supreme Court’s holding that the Takings Clause protects trade
secrets.289 It then examines the status of patents, which,
according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, do
not receive Fifth Amendment protection.290 Considering both
cases, this subpart argues that trademarks satisfy the
requirements for constitutionally protected private property
mandated in each.291
productivity and successful sale of goods.”).
285. See id. (describing the commercial interest associated with trademarks,
which promotes competition in the market).
286. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40
HARV. L. REV. 813, 818 (1927) (discussing the topic of trademark dilution).
287. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1847 (2007) (characterizing the propertization of
trademark law as a “shift . . . away from confusion-based protection and towards
a property-based regime that is focused only superficially on consumers”).
288. See id. at 1915 (“Virtually every significant doctrinal development in
the last century has given mark owners greater control over the use and
meaning of their marks.”).
289. See infra Part V.B.1 (describing a trade secret misappropriation claim
by a producer of pesticides and other chemicals).
290. See infra Part V.B.2 (summarizing a patent infringement claim by the
assignee of a patent for certain methods of manufacturing carbon fiber sheets
with controlled surface electrical resistivity).
291. See infra Part V.B.3 (considering the implications of both cases for the
constitutional protection of trademarks).
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1. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,292 the Supreme Court held that
trade secrets are property constitutionally protected from
government seizure without compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.293 Monsanto Company develops, produces, and sells
pesticides and other chemicals.294 To comply with certain
provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA), the company registered all pesticides sold in
interstate commerce with the Secretary of Agriculture.295 The
legislation also required disclosure of a producer’s pesticide
formulas.296 Challenging the disclosure requirement, Monsanto
argued that disclosure of the data constituted misappropriation of
trade secret information without just compensation.297
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court confronted the question
of whether the Fifth Amendment protected the trade secret
information submitted by Monsanto.298 The Court answered in
the affirmative.299 It determined that intangible property rights
created by an independent source such as state law deserve the
protection of the Takings Clause.300 In reaching that conclusion,
292. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
293. See id. at 1003–04 (holding that the government’s misappropriation of
data from a producer of pesticides and other chemical products constituted a
Fifth Amendment taking).
294. See id. at 997 (mentioning that the company sells products in “both
domestic and foreign markets”).
295. See id. at 991 (discussing FIFRA’s disclosure requirements).
296. Under some circumstances, FIFRA authorized the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to use trade secret information acquired from an
earlier permit applicant to evaluate the safety of a product developed by a
subsequent applicant. Id. at 991–92. Additionally, it authorized the EPA to
disclose certain data, including trade secrets and other confidential information,
“to protect against an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”
Id. at 996.
297. See id. at 998–99 (listing Monsanto’s claims).
298. See id. at 1000 (“Does Monsanto have a property interest protected by
the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause in the health, safety, and environmental
data it has submitted to EPA?”).
299. See id. at 1003–04 (stating “[t]hat intangible property rights protected
by state law are deserving of the protection of the Taking Clause” and that this
principle “has long been implicit in the thinking of” the Court).
300. See id. (noting that much of the information submitted by Monsanto
qualified as trade secrets under Missouri law).
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the Court analogized trade secrets to real property.301 According
to the Court, characteristics of trade secrets mirror those of more
tangible forms of property, including assignability and the
capacity of trade secrets to form the res of a trust.302 Next, the
Court cited the legislative history of FIFRA to support the
property-like nature of trade secrets.303 Discussing the very
amendments to FIFRA that led to the litigation, Congress
acknowledged that developers retain a “proprietary interest” in
trade secret data.304 This entitles data submitters to
compensation because they “have legal ownership of the data.”305
Finally, the Court explained its history of extending Takings
Clause protection to other forms of intangible property interests
created by state law, including liens and contracts.306
2. Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III)
While the Supreme Court found that trade secrets qualified
for Fifth Amendment protection, the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit reached the opposite conclusion
regarding the status of patents.307 Zoltek Corporation is the
assignee of a patent for certain methods of manufacturing carbon
fiber sheets with controlled surface electrical resistivity.308 The
company claimed that Lockheed Martin, which designed and
built F-22 fighter jets for the federal government, utilized carbon
301. Id. at 1002.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See id. at 1003 (invoking John Locke’s labour theory to conclude that
the notion of property “extends beyond land and tangible goods and includes the
products of an individual’s labour and invention”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
307. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III), 442 F.3d 1345, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (concluding that the government’s uses of a patented
invention or method is not a seizure of any property interest belonging to the
patentee), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and
vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
308. See id. at 1347 (“Zoltek Corporation . . . is the assignee of United States
Reissue Patent No. 34,162 (reissued Jan. 19, 1993) to a ‘Controlled Surface
Electrical Resistance Carbon Fiber Sheet Product.’”).
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fiber sheets produced through the method in Zoltek’s patent.309
Zoltek sued, claiming that the United States committed patent
infringement, which constituted a taking under the Fifth
Amendment.310 Relying on the 1894 case of Schillinger v. United
States,311 the Federal Circuit held that a patent holder could not
sue the government for patent infringement as a Fifth
Amendment taking.312
The Federal Circuit explained that property interests that
qualify as constitutional property for purposes of the Takings
Clause must arise out of “an independent source such as state
law.”313 Patents do not meet this requirement.314 Instead, federal
law creates and Congress defines the dimensions of the property
interests associated with patents.315 The court also noted that
Congress did not intend for the Fifth Amendment to protect
patents.316 It explained that:
In response to Schillinger, Congress provided a specific
sovereign immunity waiver for a patentee to recover for
infringement by the government. Had Congress intended to
clarify the dimensions of the patent rights as property
interests under the Fifth Amendment, there would have been
no need for the new and limited sovereign immunity waiver.317

Essentially, the Federal Circuit reasoned that, if the Takings
Clause protected patent rights, then “Congress’ enactment of the
1910 Patent Act (later codified at 35 U.S.C. § 1498)—expressly
309. See id. at 1349 (describing that the government contracted with
Lockheed Martin to build F-22 fighters, who subsequently subcontracted for the
production of two types of silicide fiber products used in the fifth-generation,
stealth fighter jet).
310. See id. (alleging that the silicide fiber products were made for the
government, using its claimed methods).
311. See 155 U.S. 163, 164–65 (1894) (involving a claim that against the
government for the wrongful use of a patented method for concrete stone
paving).
312. See Zoltek III, 442 F.3d at 1350 (noting that “Schillinger remains the
law”).
313. Id. at 1352 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001
(1984)).
314. Id.
315. See id. (“[P]atent rights are a creature of federal law.”).
316. Id.
317. Id.
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waiving sovereign immunity for state-sponsored patent
infringement in limited circumstances—would be superfluous.”318
C. What Does This Mean for Trademarks?
The Fifth Amendment provides trade secrets with
heightened protection against government takings.319 No other
form of intellectual property receives such protection.320 On the
other hand, the Federal Circuit explicitly held that patents are
not protected.321 Though the Monsanto and Zoltek III cases
resulted in different outcomes, both provide a framework for
assessing whether other forms of intellectual property receive
constitutional protection.322 Notably, they help answer the
question of whether trademarks constitute constitutionally
protected private property.
First, mindful of the basic axiom that the Constitution does
not create property interests, both courts reinforced the state law
creation requirement.323 In Monsanto, the Supreme Court found
that the confidential information submitted in accordance with
FIFRA constituted property under Missouri law.324 Subsequent
disclosure of the data by the EPA constituted a misappropriation

318. Additional Developments-Patent, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259, 265
(2007).
319. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984)
(summarizing the Court’s reasoning).
320. See supra Part IV.A–D (illustrating that, while trade secrets receive
heightened protection under the Takings Clause, the Supreme Court has never
held that the protections of the Takings Clause extend to other categories of
intellectual property).
321. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III), 442 F.3d 1345, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding that patents do not constitute Fifth Amendment
property), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and
vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
322. See Marlan, supra note 150, at 1614 (stating that courts will likely
apply the precedents set by the Monsanto and Zoltek III courts to a trademark
takings issue).
323. See Zoltek III, 442 F.3d at 1352 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984)).
324. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003 (characterizing the confidential
information submitted by Monsanto as a “trade secret property rights under
Missouri law”).
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of trade secret information without just compensation.325
Conversely, the Zoltek III court explained that the federal
creation of patents disqualified them from Fifth Amendment
protection.326
Current patent law stems from Congress’s authority to
regulate patents and copyrights under the Patent and Copyright
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.327 Unlike patents and copyrights,
however, Congress is prohibited from regulating trademarks
under the Patent and Copyright Clause.328 Instead, federal
trademark jurisdiction implicitly derives its authority from the
Commerce Clause.329 The fact that the U.S. Constitution does not
explicitly create trademarks distinguishes them from patents.
While the Zoltek III court mentioned the federal creation of
patents as a primary reason why they do not constitute
constitutional property, trademarks, on the other hand, are not
entirely “creature[s] of federal law.”330 Rather, trademarks are
historically the products of state common law.331 This reality
arguably satisfies the state law creation requirement for
constitutional property.

325. See id. at 1014–16 (holding that the EPA’s use and disclosure of
Monsanto’s trade secret rights constituted a taking for public use).
326. See Zoltek III, 442 F.3d at 1352 (concluding that, because patents are “a
creature of federal law,” they do not constitute property interests under the
Takings Clause).
327. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (authorizing Congress to enact
legislation governing copyrights and patents).
328. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (describing that, in 1879,
the Supreme Court denied Congress the authority to register or regulate
trademarks under the Patent and Trademark Clause).
329. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (permitting the application for registration
of “a trademark used in commerce” or of a trademark that a person has a bona
fide intention to use in commerce).
330. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III), 442 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (describing why patents do not constitute
constitutionally protected private property rights), reh’g en banc denied, 464
F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317,
1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
331. See Marlan, supra note 150, at 1617 (arguing that trademarks “meet
the state law creation requirement for constitutional property because they are
products of the common law”).
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D. Putting the Pieces Together

Applying the guidance provided by the courts in Monsanto
and
Zoltek
III,
trademarks
theoretically
constitute
constitutionally protected private property.332 First, despite its
codification under the federal Lanham Act, current trademark
law largely incorporates existing common law principles
“governing both the subject matter and scope of [trademark]
protection.”333 As originally passed in 1946, the Lanham Act
largely adopted the principles of state trademark law, but has
since expanded in ways that go beyond many states’ common law,
such as the dilution remedy.334 Second, compared with other
forms of property, trademarks meet the right-to-exclude
theorization of property that is at the core of constitutional
property.335 Under the Lanham Act and at common law,
trademarks serve an exclusionary function because exclusive use
of a mark is awarded to the first person to make a lawful,
commercial use of the mark in commerce.336 Third, the Supreme
Court recognizes that the notion of property “extends beyond land
and tangible goods and includes the products of an individual’s
labour and invention.”337 Trademarks arguably satisfy John
Locke’s labor and invention conception of property discussed in
Monsanto given “the extensive use requirements necessary . . . to
332. See id. at 1629 (concluding that, among other things, trademarks are
both legal private property and constitutionally protected property for the
purposes of the Takings Clause).
333. See Robert C. Denicola, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal
Trademark Legislation and the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 79–80 (1996) (recounting the origins of the Lanham Act,
the codification of which embraced a balance of interests drawn from “more than
a century of common law adjudication”).
334. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012) (codifying the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995, which creates a federal cause of action to protect famous
marks from unauthorized use, to prevent others from benefiting from the
established goodwill of such marks, and to prevent dilution of the
distinctiveness of such marks).
335. See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV.
357, 374 (1954) (explaining property as that “to which the following label can be
attached: To the world: Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may
grant or withhold. Signed: Private Citizen[.] Endorsed: The State”).
336. See supra Part IV.D (explaining that the exclusionary function of
trademarks preserves both private economic interests and brand identity).
337. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984).
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obtain a trademark registration, as well as the effort put forth in
the creation of a mark.”338 Fourth, in contrast to other forms of
intellectual property with limited legal lives, such as patents and
copyrights,339 the property interests associated with trademarks
potentially exist into perpetuity.340 Considered together, the
bundle of property rights associated with trademarks should
qualify as constitutional property interests, subject to the
protection of the Takings Clause. The history and development of
trademark law,341 combined with the Supreme Court’s broad
reading of the word “property” in the Fifth Amendment,
reinforces this conclusion.342
VI. Taking a Team’s Trademark
This Part concludes that the seizure of a professional sports
franchise’s trademark could constitute a valid public use under
the Takings Clause.343 Assessing a Fifth Amendment taking
requires multiple inquiries.344 As previously mentioned, the
government must pay a property owner just compensation
whenever (1) a state actor, (2) authorized by law, (3) effectuates a
taking, (4) of a private actor’s property, (5) for a valid public

338. Marlan, supra note 150, at 1617.
339. See supra Part IV.B–C (explaining that patents and copyrights confer
an owner with a set of property rights for limited times).
340. See 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a) (2012) (“[E]ach registration may be renewed for
periods of 10 years at the end of each successive 10-year period following the
date of registration.”). In addition to timely renewal, the owner of a trademark
must continue to use the mark in commerce, or risk abandonment. See id. §
1127 (describing the risk of abandonment resulting from, among other things,
the owner’s failure to use the mark in commerce).
341. See supra Part V.A (arguing that the private property-based functions
of trademarks currently dominate).
342. See supra Part III.D (arguing that The Raisin Case supports an
expansive definition of the word “property” in the Fifth Amendment, and that
the Court’s decision suggests that the Takings Clause protects intellectual
property rights).
343. See supra Part III.A (explaining the history of the public use
requirement in takings jurisprudence).
344. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text (describing the various
restrictions that the Takings Clause imposes on the government’s ability to take
private property).
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use.345 If a proposed taking satisfies each requirement, the
government is authorized to seize the property in question
notwithstanding the owner’s objection.346 According to the
Supreme Court, the government’s power to effectuate a taking
applies to private property other than real, tangible property.347
Consequently, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment also
applies to various forms of intangible property.348 Though not yet
addressed by the Supreme Court, government seizures of
trademarks should implicate the Fifth Amendment.349
The conclusion that trademarks constitute constitutionally
protected private property provides users of the mark with
greater protection against government seizures.350 In the context
of professional sports franchises, it could also provide teams with
greater protection upon relocation.351 This Part explores the
potential for a city to acquire a relocating franchise’s trademarks
through the exercise of its eminent domain powers. In doing so, it
analyzes the decisions of the courts involved with the Oakland
Raiders and Baltimore Colts litigation.352 Additionally, it

345. See Cotter, supra note 26, at 535 (summarizing the elements of a
takings claim and the requirements that the government must satisfy before
seizing property).
346. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 232 (2003)
(confirming the proposition that, provided an owner receives just compensation
for the taking of her property, that owner does not have standing to object to the
government’s decision).
347. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984)
(noting that other types of intangible rights constitute Fifth Amendment
property).
348. See supra notes 190–198 and accompanying text (explaining that,
although the protection of real property lies at the historical core of takings
protection, Fifth Amendment protection extends to multiple types of intangible
property rights).
349. See supra Part V.D (concluding that trademarks should constitute
constitutionally protected private property).
350. See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text (describing why
professional sports teams vigorously protect their trademarks and associated
goodwill from infringement).
351. See supra notes 142–149 and accompanying text (summarizing the
general restrictions imposed by the Fifth Amendment on the government’s
ability to take private property).
352. See infra Part VI.A (discussing the public use implications of the
Oakland Raiders and Baltimore Colts litigation).
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considers the aforementioned widening of the public use language
in the Takings Clause.353
A. The Eminent Domain Cases
Though the series of decisions in the Raiders litigation has
been criticized for ignoring crucial aspects of takings analysis, it
provides important precedent for future actions against
professional sports franchises.354 Rather than engaging in a more
traditional takings analysis, the final reviewing court mainly
questioned “the propriety of using the dormant commerce clause
as a limitation on an eminent domain action.”355 According to the
Raiders IV court, its conclusion on the Commerce Clause issue
obviated the need for further consideration of the City of
Oakland’s public use argument.356
Regardless of the result of the Raiders litigation, the series of
court decisions provide some guidance concerning the public use
issue.357 The Raiders I court found that the acquisition and
operation of a professional sports franchise could qualify as an
appropriate municipal function.358 Unequivocally, it indicated
that the validity of the City of Oakland’s contemplated taking
necessarily turned on its ability to demonstrate the Fifth

353. See infra Part VI.B (considering modern franchise free agency in light
of the Supreme Court’s arguable annihilation of the public use requirement).
354. The Raiders IV court largely avoided the public use and just
compensation issues before the court. See Greg L. Johnson, City of Oakland v.
Oakland Raiders (Raiders IV): Commerce Clause Scrutiny as an End-Run
Around Traditional Public Use Analysis, 1 BYU J. PUB. L. 335, 360 (1987) (“The
irony of all of the Raiders litigation is that the crucial, traditional, and
fundamental points of taking analysis . . . received virtually no attention in
comparison with other issues.”).
355. See id. (“The appeals court did not attempt to justify its revolutionary
approach, except to say that prior cases have simply never presented the issue
as Raiders IV did.”).
356. See Raiders IV, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (asserting
that the conclusions reached on the Commerce Clause and antitrust issues
outweighed any legitimate public use claims alleged by the City of Oakland).
357. See supra Part II.A.1 (summarizing the Raiders litigation).
358. See Raiders I, 646 P.2d 835, 843 (Cal. 1982) (concluding that, if the City
of Oakland could demonstrate a valid public use, the acquisition and operation
of the Raiders franchise would qualify as an appropriate municipal function).
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Amendment’s public use requirement.359 In doing so, it extended
the public use doctrine to “matters of public health, recreation
and enjoyment.”360 The court articulated that the government’s
ability to provide the public access to spectator sports is an
appropriate municipal function.361 Additionally, even though the
Raiders IV court invalidated the City of Oakland’s proposed
action, different circumstances might have resulted in a different
conclusion. The court implied that the exercise of eminent domain
is appropriate where compelling state interests outweigh the
burdens on interstate commerce.362 Unfortunately, the appellate
courts in the Raiders cases never fully addressed the validity of
the City of Oakland’s public use claims.363
Though the City of Oakland did not prevail, its response
provided a legitimate course of action for future victims of
franchise free agency.364 Following the litigation, a professional
sports franchise could no longer scoff at a city’s threat to exercise
its eminent domain powers against the team’s tangible and
intangible property rights.365 Based on the implications of the
Raiders decisions, different circumstances and a showing of

359. See id. (determining that, “[i]f such valid public use can be
demonstrated, the statutes discussed herein afford City the power to acquire by
eminent domain any property necessary to accomplish that use”). While the trial
court addressed the public use issue on the final remand, the Raiders IV appeals
court avoided the public use issue. See supra notes 60–63 (describing that the
Raiders IV court invalidated the City of Oakland’s proposed action on dormant
Commerce Clause grounds).
360. Raiders I, 646 P.2d at 841.
361. See id. at 841–42 (utilizing the examples of stadiums owned and
operated by municipalities, including Candlestick Park in San Francisco, to
bolster the argument that providing access to recreation “in the form of
spectator sports is an appropriate function of city government”).
362. See id. (implying that more compelling reasons that justify the exercise
of eminent domain include the promotion of health, safety, and fair economic
competition).
363. See, e.g., Raiders IV, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (“Our
conclusion on the commerce clause obviates the need for further consideration of
the public use and antitrust arguments.”).
364. See Portner, supra note 39, at 549 (describing the influence of eminent
domain on sports franchises following the initiation of the Raiders litigation).
365. See Joyce, III, supra note 24, at 553 n.2 (mentioning that a member of
the Raider’s team counsel termed the City of Oakland’s efforts to acquire the
team by eminent domain “a joke”).
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public use could justify the condemnation of a professional sports
franchise.366
The Colts litigation focused on another set of eminent domain
issues, but still provides valuable guidance for question of
whether the seizure of a professional sports team’s trademark
could constitute a public purpose.367 As discussed by the district
court, the propriety of condemning a business is dependent upon
the situs and jurisdictional reach of the government.368 Because
the Colts franchise relocated the night before the Maryland
legislature enacted the Emergency Bill No. 1042, the City of
Baltimore lacked jurisdiction to seize the franchise.369 Similar to
the Raiders IV court, the Maryland District Court also avoided
the public use issue.370 Considering that the Colts prevailed on
the threshold issue of the appropriate date for determining the
situs of the franchise, it did not contemplate a thorough eminent
domain analysis.371
The Raiders and Colts cases support the proposition that the
Public Use Clause could permit the seizure of a professional
sports team’s trademark, contingent on the satisfaction of certain
requirements.372 This is true regardless of the fact that the cities
366. See Portner, supra note 39, at 548–51 (explaining the significance of the
Raiders litigation and its influence on the expansion of the public use
requirement of the Fifth Amendment).
367. See supra notes 87–93 and accompanying text (summarizing the issues
presented by the Colts litigation and their subsequent resolution by the
Maryland District Court).
368. See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club Inc.,
624 F. Supp. 278, 284 (D. Md. 1985) (“It is, of course, axiomatic that a sovereign
state’s power to condemn property extends only as far as its borders and that
the property to be taken must be within the state’s jurisdictional boundaries.”).
369. See id. at 287 (finding that the City of Baltimore lacked the authority to
seize the Colts franchise because the team relocated outside the state before the
City initiated an eminent domain action).
370. See id. (concluding that an eminent domain analysis was not required
because the Colts “prevailed on the threshold issue of the appropriate date for
determining the situs of the franchise”).
371. See id. (stating that three consideration drove the court’s conclusion,
including the fact that (1) the team’s principal place of business no longer in
Maryland, (2) the team’s tangible property was located in Indianapolis before
the March 30 filing, and (3) Irsay’s intentions for the Colts to escape Maryland’s
jurisdiction).
372. See, e.g., Raiders I, 646 P.2d 835, 843 (Cal. 1982) (finding that the
seizure of a professional sports franchise could constitute an appropriate
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of Oakland and Baltimore failed to stop their teams from
relocating.373 They suggest that “the broad definition and the
limited review applied to legislative determinations of public use
indicate that the limitation is broad enough to encompass such a
taking.”374
B. Future Implications and Leveling the Playing Field
A professional sports franchise’s trademarks operate to
protect the proprietary interest in the team’s name, logo, and
colors, but as a matter of public interest, this property-like right
can be seized pursuant to a valid public use.375 The expansive
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s public use requirement
supports this claim.376 While the Midkiff and Kelo decisions
received considerable attention and criticism, they affirmed the
encompassing nature of public use.377 The government’s right to
interfere with private property rights emerged in the early
nineteenth century, coinciding with the nation’s economic
growth.378 In many respects, the current, broad interpretation of
public use represents years of state action and judicial
precedent.379

municipal function contingent on the demonstration of a valid public use).
373. See Portner, supra note 39, at 548 (“A broad interpretation of the public
use requirement in eminent domain law has also been applied where cities have
used sports franchises to aid their economy.”).
374. See Joyce, III, supra note 24, at 571 (applying the Public Use Clause to
sports franchises).
375. See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text (commenting on the role
played by trademarks in protecting a professional sports franchise’s brand).
376. See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text (describing that, in the
years after the Midkiff decision, the Public Use Clause did not impose a
significant impediment to state and local efforts to condemn private property).
377. See supra Part III.A (discussing the Midkiff and Kelo cases, which
clarified the broad and inclusive nature of the public use requirement).
378. See Portner, supra note 39, at 542–44 (summarizing the historical
background of the public use limitation).
379. See id. at 542–51 (examining multiple decisions in eminent domain
cases that demonstrate a willingness by state and federal courts to expand the
definition of public use).

CONDEMNING CLOTHES

59

The fact that sports fans cheer for clothes sets the stage for
disputes over valuable trademarks.380 Arguably, the name, logo,
and colors associated with a professional sports franchise are the
most important aspects of the team.381 The marks identify and
promote a team’s products and services in commerce, and
represent millions of dollars in value.382 Therefore, cities have a
significant interest in preventing a team’s trademark from
relocating, regardless of what happens to the franchise’s physical
property.383
The condemnation of a professional sports franchise’s
trademark arguably serves the purpose of encouraging
recreational and spectator activity, promoting civic identity, and
protecting a substantial source of revenue.384 Given the Supreme
Court’s deferential approach to legislative determinations of
public use, such an argument theoretically satisfies the
requirements of the Fifth Amendment.385 Therefore, while
franchises may appear to hold most of the cards in relocation, the
exercise of eminent domain power to obtain a relocating team’s
trademark is a viable option for a city to protect its interests.386 If
successful, cities could avoid a substantial loss of local identity
and tradition by securing trademarks with significant financial,
emotional, and functional value.387
380. Recall Seinfeld’s explanation of why sports fans cheer for clothes. See
supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text (describing that a sports franchise’s
clothes represent a particular brand, which symbolize a team’s home
community).
381. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text (explaining that the
intangible intellectual property interests associated with a professional sports
franchise add substantial value and marketability).
382. See Hetzel, supra note 8, at 142 (describing that, each year, sports team
utilize their popularity to sell millions of dollars in products and services).
383. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (discussing measures
taken by the City of Cleveland to secure the Browns’ name and other
trademarks following Art Modell’s announcement that the franchise would
relocate to Baltimore, Maryland).
384. See supra notes 6–16 and accompanying text (analyzing the value
associated with a professional sports franchise’s trademarks).
385. See supra Part III.A (illustrating the widening of the public use
language in the Takings Clause).
386. See supra Part VI.A (concluding that the exercise of eminent domain to
seize a relocating team’s trademark could prevail considering the guidance
provided by the courts in the Oakland Raiders and Baltimore Colts litigation).
387. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text (explaining the attachment
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VII. Conclusion

The resurgence in franchise free agency in the NFL
potentially implicates the loss of a significant source of local
identity and tradition for multiple cities. Even if the City of St.
Louis does not challenge the Rams’ relocation to Los Angeles,
California, the NFL’s January 2016 vote permits the Chargers
and Raiders franchises to move under certain circumstances. The
relocation approval also sets the stage for a new generation of
controversies over team property should a breakdown in
negotiations occur. This includes disputes over valuable team
logos and other trademarks. While courts ruled against the cities
of Oakland and Baltimore nearly four decades ago, it is unclear
whether another eminent domain action could succeed
considering the expansive interpretation of the Public Use
Clause.
Theoretically, an action to seize a team’s trademarks could
prevail. After all, trademarks embody, arguably, the most
important aspect of a professional sports franchise—a brand that
represents the team’s history and traditions, its host city, and its
fans. This possibility remains regardless of the likely status of
trademarks as constitutionally protected private property.
Considering Supreme Court precedents and rulings of lower
courts, it is clear that post-Kelo, the taking of a trademark in the
professional sports franchise context could constitute a valid
public use, contingent on the payment of just compensation.

of fans to a sports team’s clothes).

